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On the Possible Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Exemption for India

The letter from over 150 induvudual and organizations (including NPEC) urges the Member States of the NSG not to exempt India from NSG rules — which currently prohibit nuclear trade with India because it has neither signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty nor accepted full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards — unless the NSG first imposes "meaningful and common sense conditions and restrictions on nuclear trade with India" to promote nuclear nonproliferation.

For news coverage, see The Hindu´s article, "Tighten Draft Waiver for India, NSG Urged" (August 16, 2008), which cites NPEC Executive Director Henry Sokolski

Aug 18, 2008
NGO Letter to NSG on India Exemption (PDF) 127.49 KB


Decision Time on the Indian Nuclear Deal: Help Avert a Nonproliferation Disaster

August 15, 2008
Federal Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier
Federal Foreign Office
Auswartiges Amt
11013 Berlin

Dear Minister Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier:
Your government and other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) are being asked to consider the Bush administration’s proposal to exempt India from longstanding NSG guidelines that require comprehensive IAEA safeguards as a condition of supply.
As many of us wrote in a January 2008 letter (“Fix the Proposal for Nuclear Cooperation with India”, India's commitments under the current terms of the proposed arrangement do not justify making far-reaching exceptions to international nonproliferation rules and norms.

Contrary to the claims of its advocates, the deal fails to bring India further into conformity with the nonproliferation behavior expected of the member states of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Unlike 178 other countries, India has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It continues to produce fissile material and expand its nuclear arsenal. As one of only three states never to have signed the NPT, it has not made a legally-binding commitment to achieve nuclear disarmament, and it refuses to allow comprehensive, full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

Yet the arrangement would give India rights and privileges of civil nuclear trade that have been reserved only for members in good standing under the NPT. It creates a dangerous distinction between "good" proliferators and "bad" proliferators and sends out misleading signals to the international community with regard to NPT norms.

We urge you to support measures that would avert further damage to the already beleaguered global nonproliferation and disarmament regime.
Given that the NSG only takes decisions by consensus, your government has a responsibility to consider the following adverse implications of the U.S. proposal to exempt India from key NSG guidelines:

1. Undermining the Nuclear Safeguards Regime
The proposed exemption of India from the comprehensive nuclear safeguards standard of supply threatens to undermine the nuclear safeguards system. Given that India maintains a nuclear weapons program outside of safeguards, facility-specific safeguards on a few additional “civilian” reactors provide no serious nonproliferation benefits.

As part of the carefully crafted final document of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, all NPT states-parties endorsed the principle of full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. A decision by the NSG to exempt India from this requirement would also contradict this important element of the NPT bargain. Furthermore, it is inappropriate for the member states of the NSG to take it upon themselves to make a decision on this matter for the 140-plus other members of the NPT.

Making matters worse, Indian officials have suggested that it might cease IAEA scrutiny if fuel supplies are cut off, even if that is because it renews nuclear testing. NSG members should reject such an interpretation. Your government has a solemn responsibility to reject any India-specific exemption from NSG guidelines that is premised on a safeguards agreement that is in any way inconsistent with the principle of permanent safeguards over all nuclear materials and facilities.

India also pledged on July 18, 2005 to conclude an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement. States should insist that India conclude a meaningful Additional Protocol safeguards regime before considering whether and how to make any India-specific alteration to the NSG guidelines.

2. Possible Transfer of Sensitive Enrichment and Reprocessing Items
Unless rejected by the NSG, India’s insistence on obtaining “full” nuclear cooperation would undermine efforts to prevent the proliferation of technologies that may be used to produce nuclear bomb material, including reprocessing and enrichment technologies and items. Allowing transfers of these sensitive nuclear technologies is extremely unwise given that IAEA safeguards cannot prevent such items from being replicated and used to advance India’s weapons program. U.S. officials have stated that they do not intend to sell such technology, but other states may. Virtually all NSG states support proposals that would bar transfers of these sensitive nuclear technologies to non-NPT members. India must be no exception.
Recall that India detonated a nuclear device in 1974 that used plutonium harvested from a reactor supplied by Canada using heavy water from the United States in violation of earlier bilateral peaceful nuclear use agreements.

3. Indirect Assistance to India’s Nuclear Weapons Program
In the absence of a suspension of fissile material production for weapons by India, foreign nuclear fuel supplies would free up India’s relatively limited domestic supplies to be used exclusively in its military nuclear sector, thereby indirectly contributing to the potential expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal. This would contradict the spirit if not the letter of Article I of the NPT (which prohibits direct or indirect assistance to another state’s nuclear weapons program), and it would spur further arms racing in South Asia.

India’s political commitment to support negotiations of a global verifiable fissile material cut off treaty is a hollow gesture given the fact that states have failed to initiate negotiations on such a treaty for over a decade.

4. Facilitating Indian Nuclear Testing
If, as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said on July 18, 2005, India would “assume the same responsibilities and practices” as other countries with advanced nuclear capabilities, it is reasonable to expect that India should agree to a legally-binding moratorium on nuclear test explosions. It would be highly irresponsible for CTBT signatories not to establish CTBT signature as a basic condition for NSG nuclear trade with India or any state that has not yet signed that treaty.

While Singh has reiterated his commitment to maintaining India’s voluntary nuclear test moratorium, India has refused to make any commitment to a legally-binding commitment to a test ban and has sought to avoid the possibility of any penalty in the event that it does resume testing. As Singh asserted most recently in his July 22 statement to the Lok Sabha, “I confirm that there is nothing in these agreements which prevents us from further nuclear tests if warranted by our national security concerns.”

To reduce the impact of a fuel supply cut off if India were to resume nuclear testing, Indian officials have gone further and are demanding a so-called “clean” and “unconditional” exemption from NSG guidelines and are seeking bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements that help provide India with strategic fuel reserves and/or lifetime fuel guarantees.

This flatly contradicts a provision in the 2006 U.S. Henry Hyde Act, which was championed by Sen. Barack Obama and approved by the U.S. Congress that stipulates that fuel supplies be limited to reasonable reactor operating requirements.1 It would also contradict the policy mandated by the U.S. implementing legislation that a nuclear test would lead to the immediate cessation of all U.S. nuclear cooperation with India.
If nuclear testing is to be deterred, meaningful penalties must be available. If NSG states do agree to supply fuel for India’s “civilian” nuclear sector, they must avoid arrangements that would enable or encourage future nuclear testing by India. Otherwise, you and your government may become complicit in the facilitation of a new round of destabilizing nuclear tests.

In light of the above-mentioned flaws in the ill-conceived proposal to exempt India from certain NSG guidelines, we recommend that:
• If NSG supplier states agree to supply fuel to India, they should establish a policy that if India resumes nuclear testing, or if India violates its safeguards agreement with the IAEA or withdraws “civilian” facilities or materials from international safeguards, all nuclear cooperation with India involving NSG members shall be terminated and unused fuel supplies from NSG states shall be returned.
1 See September 16, 2006 exchange on the floor of the U.S. Senate between Sen. Barack Obama and Sen. Richard Lugar, then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, available from < > and <>. Also see Sec. 103 (b) para 10 of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act.

• If NSG supplier states agree to supply fuel to India, they should do so in a manner that is commensurate with ordinary reactor operating requirements and not provide – individually or collectively – strategic or lifetime nuclear fuel reserves.
• NSG states should expressly prohibit any transfer of sensitive plutonium reprocessing, uranium enrichment, or heavy water production items to India, whether inside or outside bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements.
• NSG states should actively oppose any arrangement that would give India any special safeguards exemptions or would in any way be inconsistent with the principle of permanent and unconditional safeguards over all nuclear materials and facilities subject to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
• Before India is granted a waiver from the NSG’s full-scope safeguards standard, it should join the other original nuclear weapon states by declaring it has stopped fissile material production for weapons purposes and transform its nuclear test moratorium into a meaningful, legally-binding commitment.2
• NSG states should agree not to grant India consent to reprocess nuclear fuel supplied by an NSG member state in a facility that is not under permanent and unconditional IAEA safeguards, and also agree that any material produced in other facilities may not be transferred to any unsafeguarded facility.
• NSG states should agree that all bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements between an NSG member state and India explicitly prohibit the replication or use of such technology in any unsafeguarded Indian facilities.

The Indian nuclear deal would be a nonproliferation disaster and a serious setback to the prospects of global nuclear disarmament, especially now. For those world leaders who are serious about ending the arms race, holding all states to their international commitments, and strengthening the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, it is time to stand up and be counted.


Daryl G. Kimball Hideyuki Ban
Executive Director Co-Director
Arms Control Association (Washington) Citizens' Nuclear Information Center (Tokyo)
Steven Staples
Rideau Institute on International Affairs (Ottawa)
Global Secretariat to Abolition 2000
*Full list of endorsements continues on following pages.
2 All UN member states are also obligated to support UN Security Council Resolution 1172, which calls on India and Pakistan to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) stop producing fissile material for weapons, and undertake other nuclear risk reduction measures. All NSG states have a responsibility to uphold their obligations under UNSC 1172 by reiterating and actively encouraging India and Pakistan to implement these and other nuclear restraint measures.
Contact Addresses:
Arms Control Association
1313 L Street NW, Washington, DC 20005
Tel: (202) 463-8270 Fax: (202) 463-8273
Abolition 2000 US-India Deal Working Group
c/o Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, Akebonobashi Co-op 2F-B, 8-5 Sumiyoshi-cho, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, 162-0065, Japan
Tel: 03-3357-3800 Fax: 03-3357-3801
Endorsements continued (updated August 15, 2008)
Individual Endorsements (organizations/institutions listed for identification purposes only)
Tadatoshi Akiba (Japan)
Dennis Brutus (South Africa)
Mayor of Hiroshima
Honorary Professor Centre for Civil Society
University of Kwazulu-Natal, Durban
Tomihisa Taue (Japan)
Mayor of Nagasaki City
Adele Buckley (Canada)
Canadian Pugwash Group
Amb. Richard Broinowski (Australia)
Executive Committee, Member
Adjunct Professor,
Pugwash Council
School of Letters, Art and Media
University of Sydney, and
Michael Byers (Canada)
Former Ambassador to Vietnam, Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Central American Republics and Cuba
Chair in Global Politics and Intl. Law
University of British Columbia
Helen Caldicott (Australia)
Amb. George Bunn (Stanford, CA, USA)
Co-founder, Physicians for Social Responsibility
First General Consul for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Founder, Women’s Action for Nuclear Disarmament
Former Ambassador to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, and
Founder, Nuclear Policy Research Institute
Consulting Professor at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Noam Chomsky (Cambridge, MA, USA)
Stanford University
Emeritus Professor of Linguistics and Philosophy
Amb. Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, and
Joseph Cirincione (USA)
President of the 1995 NPT Review & Extension Conference
Ploughshares Fund
Amb. Robert Grey (USA)
Mark Diesendorf (Australia)
Director, Bipartisan Security Group
Senior Lecturer
Former U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament
Institute of Environmental Studies
University of New South Wales
Fred McGoldrick (USA) Consultant and
Jim Falk (Australia)
Former Director of Nonproliferation and Export Policy U.S. Department of State
Australian Centre for Science, Innovation, and Society
Melbourne University
Hon. Douglas Roche, O.C., (Canada)
Canadian Senator Emeritus
Charles D. Ferguson (Washington, D.C., USA)
Former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament
Philip D. Reed Senior Fellow for Science and Technology
Praful Bidwai (India)
Council on Foreign Relations
Senior journalist and author
Fellow at the Transnational Institute
Zia Mian (Princeton, NJ, USA)
John Finney (UK)
Research Scientist
Chair, British Pugwash Group
Program on Science and Global Security
Member of the Council and Executive Committee of International Pugwash
Princeton University
Department of Physics and Astronomy
Gavin Mudd (Australia)
University College London
Engineering Lecturer
Monash University
Geoffrey Forden (Cambridge, MA, USA)
Research Associate, Program in Science, Technology and Society
Masashi Nishihara (Japan)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Research Institute for Peace and Security
Lt. Gen. Robert Gard Jr. (USA, Ret.)
Jin Hee Park (South Korea)
Senior Military Fellow
Assistant Professor
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Dongguk University
William C. Potter (Monterey, CA, USA)
Subrata Ghoshroy (Cambridge, MA, USA)
Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies
Research Associate, Program in Science, Technology and Society
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Monterey Institute of International Studies
Ernie Regehr, O.C. (Canada)
Prof. Dr. Ulrich Gottstein (Germany)
Emeritus IPPNW Vice President Europe and
Project Ploughshares of Canada
Honorary board member, IPPNW-Germany
Adjunct Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies
Frank von Hippel (Princeton, NJ, USA)
University of Waterloo
Professor of Public and International Affairs
Program on Science and Global Security
Alan Roberts (Australia)
Princeton University
Former member of the
Nuclear Safety Committee of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency
Kayoko Ikeda (Japan)
Member of the Committee of Seven for World Peace Appeal
Timothy L. Savage (Republic of Korea)
Jungmin Kang (Stanford, CA, USA)
Deputy Director
Science Fellow
Nautilus Institute at Seoul
Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University
Shoji Sawada (Japan)
Emeritus Professor
Michiji Konuma (Japan)
Nagoya University
Member of the Committee of Seven for World Peace Appeal
Henry D. Sokolski (USA)
Former Council Member of the Pugwash Conferences, and
Executive Director
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Professor Emeritus, Keio University and Musashi Institute of Technology
Tatsujiro Suzuki (Japan)
Member, Japan Pugwash Group
Oliver Meier (Germany)
Co-founder, Peace Pledge Japan
Hamburg Peace Research Institute
Takao Takahara (Japan)
Professor, International Peace Research Institute
Meijigakuin University
Hideo Tsuchiyama (Japan)
Member of The Committee of Seven for World Peace Appeal
Emeritus Professor and former President of Nagasaki University
Aaron Tovish
Director, 2020 Vision Campaign
Mayors for Peace
Hiromichi Umebayashi (Japan)
Special Advisor
Peace Depot
Achin Vanaik (India)
Professor of International Relations and Global Politics
Department of Political Science
Delhi University
Fellow, Transnational Institute
Leonard Weiss (United States)
Consultant and Chief Architect of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978
Kiho Yi ( Republic of Korea)
Research Professor
Democracy and Social Movement Institute
Sungkonghoe University
Ichiro Yuasa (Japan)
Peace Depot
International NGOs
Regina Hagen
International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation
Tilman Ruff
Chair, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
Chair, Australian Management Committee of ICAN
Susi Snyder
Secretary General
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
Alyn Ware
International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms
National and Local NGOs
South Asia
Sujay Basu
Centre of Energy and Environment Management (Kolkata)
Santanu Chacraverti
Society for Direct Initiative for Social and Health Action
Anil K. Chaudhary
Popular Education and Action Centre (New Delhi)
Sajaya Kakarla
Caring Citizens Collective (Hyderabad)
Saraswati Kavula and Dr. Satya Lakshmi Komarraju
Movement Against Uranium Projects (Hyderabad)
N. Ramesh
Journalists Against Nuclear Weapons, Thanjavur Chapter
Captain J. Rama Rao and Dr. K. Babu Rao
Forum for Sustainable Development (Hyderabad)
Sukla Sen
EKTA (Committee for Communal Amity) (Mumbai)
S. P. Udayakumar
People's Movement Against Nuclear Energy (Nagercoil, Tamil Nadu)
South Asian Diaspora
Harsh Kapoor
South Asians Against Nukes (France)
Hari Sharma
South Asian Network for Secularism and Democracy (Vancouver, Canada)
South Africa
Genni Easton
Table View Ratepayers Association
Dominique Gilbert
Pelindaba Working Group
Mike Kantey
National Chair
Coalition Against Nuclear Energy
Andy W. Pienaar
Namaqualand Action Group for Environmental Justice (Komaggas)
East Asia
Sadao Ichikawa
Japan Congress Against A- and H- Bombs (Gensuikin)
Mayako Ishii
YWCA of Japan
Kenichi Ohkubo
Secretary General
Japan Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (JALANA)
Goro Kawai, Haruko Moritaki, Mitsuo Okamoto
Hiroshima Alliance for Nuclear Weapons Abolition
Akira Kawasaki
Executive Committee Member
Peace Boat
Nobuo Kazashi, Director and
Haruko Moritaki, Executive Director
NO DU Hiroshima Project
Masayoshi Naito
Citizens' Network for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (Tokyo)
Osamu Niikura
Japanese Lawyers International Solidarity Association
Daisuke Sato
NoNukes Asia Forum Japan
Yoshiko Shidara
Women's Democratic Club
Aileen Mioko Smith
Green Action (Kyoto)
Terumi Tanaka
Secretary General
Nihon Hidankyo (Japan Confederation of A- and H-bomb Sufferers)
Republic of Korea
Cheong Wooksik
Peace Network
Koo Kab-woo
Center for Peace and Disarmament
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy
Lee Heonseok
Korea Eco-Center
Park Jung-eun
Chief Coordinator
Center for Peace and Disarmament
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy
Seok Kwanghoon
Energy Policy Consultant
Green Korea United
Ronald McCoy
Malaysian Physicians for Peace and Social Responsibility
Hildegard Breiner
Naturschutzbund Osterreich, Landesgruppe Vorarlberg (Dornbirn) and
Vorarlberger Plattform gegen Atomgefahren (Bregenz)
Pete Hämmerle
Austrian Fellowship of Reconciliation
(Internationaler Versöhnungsbund, Österreichischer Zweig)
Hans Holzinger
Robert-Jungk-Foundation (Salzburg)
Maga. Johanna Nekowitsch
Wiener Plattform "Atomkraftfreie Zukunft"
Matthias Reichl
Center for Encounter and active Non-Violence (Bad Ischl)
Dr. Klaus Renoldner, Chair
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War Austria
Heinz Stockinger
PLAGE (Salzburg Platform Against Nuclear Dangers)
Jef De Loof
'Physicians for Peace' (Belgian Affiliate of IPPNW)
Gio De Weerd
Pax Christi Vlaanderen
David Heller
Friends of the Earth, Flanders & Brussels
Hans Lammerant
Vredesactie – Bombspotting
Georges Spriet
Secretary General
Michel Vanhoorne
Left Ecological Forum
Laura Lodenius
Executive Director
Peace Union of Finland
Anna-Liisa Mattsoff
No More Nuclear Power movement
Dominique Lalanne
Abolition of Nuclear Weapons / Stop essais
Johannes M. Becker
Wissenschaft & Frieden
Xanthe Hall
IPPNW Germany
Martin Kalinowski
Forschungsverbund Naturwissenschaft, Abrüstung und internationale Sicherheit (FONAS)
Prof. Götz Neuneck, Ph.D.
Germany Pugwash Group
Mary McCarrick
Executive Committee Member
Irish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
Albino Bizzotto
Beati i Costruttori di Pace (Blessed Are the Peacemakers)
Lisa Clark
Nuclear Weapons Working Group
Rete Italiana per il Disarmo (Italian Disarmament Network)
Nicola Cufaro Petroni
Secretary Generale
USPID (Union of Scientists for Disarmament)
Marjan Lucas
IKV Pax Christi Netherlands
Ak Malten
Global Anti-Nuclear Alliance
Fred Valkenburg
Pais (Dutch Section War Resisters International)
Wendela de Vries
Campagne tegen Wapenhandel (Campaign Against Arms Trade)
Tordis Sørensen Høifødt
Norske Leger mot atomvåpen, NLA
(Norwegian Affiliate of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War)
Stine Rodmyr
No to Nuclear Weapons
Alexey Toropov
NGO Siberian Ecological Agency
Josep Puig
Group of Scientists and Technicians for a Non Nuclear Future (Barcelona)
Frida Sundberg (President) and Gunnar Westberg (Member of the Board)
Swedish Physicians Against Nuclear Weapons (SLMK)
United Kingdom
Pat Haward (Chair) and George Farebrother (Secretary)
World Court Project UK
Paul Ingram
Executive Director
British American Security Information Council (London and Washington, D.C.)
Michael Denborough
The Nuclear Disarmament Party of Australia
John Hallam
People for Nuclear Disarmament Nuclear Flashpoints Project
Don Jarrett
Australian Peace Committee
Pauline Mitchell
Campaign for International Cooperation and Disarmament (Melbourne)
South Australian Regional Meeting
Religious Society of Friends (Quakers)
Cam Walker
National Liaison Officer
Friends of the Earth Australia
Sue Wareham OAM
Medical Association for Prevention of War
New Zealand
Dr. Kate Dewes (Coordinator) and Commander Robert D. Green (Royal Navy - Ret.)
Disarmament & Security Centre (Christchurch, New Zealand)
Simon Reeves
Aotearoa Lawyers for Peace
North America
Elaine Hughes
Stop the Hogs Coalition
S. (Ziggy) Kleinau
Citizens for Renewable Energy (Lion's Head, Ontario)
David H. Martin
Climate & Energy Coordinator
Greenpeace (Canada)
Dr. Joan Russow
Global Compliance Research Project (Victoria, B.C.)
Laura Savinkoff
Boundary Peace Initiative (Grand Forks, B.C.)
Luis Gutiérrez Esparza
Latin American Circle for International Studies (Mexico City)
USA – National
David Culp
Legislative Representative
Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quakers) (Washington, DC)
Marie Dennis
Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns (Washington, DC)
Bruce K. Gagnon
Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space
Amy Isaacs
National Director
Americans for Democratic Action (Washington, DC)
John Isaacs
Executive Director
Council for a Livable World (Washington, DC)
Rob Keithan
Washington Office for Advocacy
Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations (Washington, DC)
Michael Mariotte
Executive Director
Nuclear Information and Resource Service
Paul Kawika Martin
Organizing and Policy Director
Peace Action
Michael McNally, MD, Ph. D
Executive Director
Physicians for Social Responsibility
Jon Rainwater
Executive Director
Peace Action West
Susan Shaer
Executive Director
Women’s Action for New Directions (Washington, DC)
Alice Slater
Abolition 2000 Sustainable Energy Working Group
USA – Regional
Chuck Baynton
Wisconsin Network for Peace and Justice
Ken Bossong
Executive Director
SUN DAY Campaign (Takoma Park, MD)
Buffalo Bruce
Western Nebraska Resources Council
George Crocker
Executive Director
North American Water Office (Lake Elmo, MN)
Mary Davis
Yggdrasil, a project of Earth Island Institute (Lexington, KY)
Elena Day
Steering Committee Chair
People's Alliance for Safe Energy (Charlottesville, VA)
Bruce A. Drew
Steering Committee
Prairie Island Coalition (Minneapolis, MN)
Wells Eddleman
Staff Scientist
North Carolina Citizens Research Group
Judi Friedman
People’s Action for Clean Energy (Connecticut)
Marylia Kelley
Executive Director
Tri-Valley CAREs (Livermore, CA)
Mary Lampert
Pilgrim Watch (Duxbury, MA)
Conrad Miller, MD
Physicians For Life (Watermill, NY)
Capt. William S. Linnell
Cheaper, Safer Power (Portland, OR)
Sal Mangiagli
Board Member
Citizens Awareness Network - Connecticut Chapter
Alan Muller
Executive Director
Green Delaware
Lewis E. Patrie, MD
Western North Carolina Physicians for Social Responsibility 13
Guy C. Quinlan
Chair, Nuclear Disarmament Task Force
All Souls Unitarian Church (New York, NY)
Judy Treichel
Executive Director
Nevada Nuclear Waste Task Force (Las Vegas, NV)
Michael Welch
Redwood Alliance (Arcata, CA)


The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), is a 501 (c)3 nonpartisan, nonprofit, educational organization
founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues. NPEC educates policymakers, journalists,
and university professors about proliferation threats and possible new policies and measures to meet them.
1600 Wilson Blvd. | Suite 640 | Arlington, VA 22209 | phone: 571-970-3187 |