Long discounted by arms control critics, traditional nonproliferation efforts now are undergoing urgent review and reconsideration even by their supporters. Why? In large part, because the current crop of nonproliferation understandings are ill-suited to check the spread of emerging long-range missile, biological, and nuclear technologies. Missile defense and unmanned air vehicle-related technologies are proliferating for a variety of perfectly defensive and peaceful civilian applications. This same know-how can be used to defeat U.S. and allied air and missile defenses in new ways that are far more stressful than the existing set of ballistic missile threats. Unfortunately, the Missile Technology Control Regime is not yet optimized to cope with these challenges. Nuclear technologies have become much more difficult to control since new centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities and relatively small fuel reprocessing plants can now be built and hidden much more readily than nuclear fuel-making plants that were operating when the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the bulk of International Atomic Energy Agency inspections procedures were first devised 30 or more years ago. This volume is designed to highlight what might happen if these emerging threats go unattended and how best to mitigate them. 

The Strategic Studies Institute Publications Office, United States Army War College

Edited by NPEC executive director Henry Sokolski - 2006

This book examines what additional security threats Iran might pose as it becomes increasingly capable of making nuclear weapons, what steps the United States and its friends might take to deter and contain it, and what should be done to assure Iran's neighbors do not follow in Tehran's nuclear footsteps. 

The Strategic Studies Institute Publications Office, United States Army War College

Edited by Patrick Clawson and NPEC executive director Henry Sokolski - 2005

Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice is the first critical history of the intellectual roots and actual application of the strategic doctrine of nuclear mutual assured destruction or MAD. Written by the world's leading French, British, and American military policy planners and analysts, this volume examines how MAD and its emphasis on the military targeting of population centers influenced the operational plans of the major nuclear powers and smaller nuclear states such as Pakistan, India, and Israel. Given America's efforts to move away from MAD and the continued reliance on MAD thinking by smaller nations to help justify further nuclear proliferation, Getting MAD is a timely must read for anyone eager to understand our nuclear past and future. 

The Strategic Studies Institute Publications Office, United States Army War College

Edited by NPEC executive director Henry Sokolski - 2004

The fear about what Iran might do with nuclear weapons is fed by the concern that Tehran has no clear reason to be pursuing nuclear weapons. The strategic rationale for Iran's nuclear program is by no means obvious. Unlike proliferators such as Israel or Pakistan, Iran faces no historic enemy who would welcome an opportunity to wipe the state off the face of the earth. Nevertheless, Iran's nuclear program poses a stark challenge to the international nonproliferation regime and raises stark shortcomings with global nonproliferation norms, namely the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. If the world community, led by Western countries, is unable to prevent Iranian proliferation, then it is unclear that there is much meaning to global nonproliferation norms. 

The Strategic Studies Institute Publications Office, United States Army War College

Edited by Patrick Clawson and  NPEC executive director Henry Sokolski - 2004

This book was originally commissioned by the NPEC as part of a study on the future of U.S.-Russian nonproliferation cooperation. It is different from other studies of U.S.-Russian cooperation because it relies on competitive strategies, which detail how best to pit one's strengths against a competitor's weaknesses in a series of moves and countermoves. The goal is to devise strategies that force one's competitor to spend more time and resources shoring up his weaknesses than in taking offensive action. 

The Strategic Studies Institute Publications Office, United States Army War College

Edited by Thomas Riisager and NPEC executive director Henry Sokolski - 2002