

CHAPTER 5

WINNING IRANIAN HEARTS AND MINDS

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Iran could become a nuclear capable state in the next 24-30 months (June 2003-December 2005), in light of progress at Bushehr and other, undeclared, facilities. The military option—from preemptive strikes against nuclear facilities to a full-scale invasion—is one way to preclude this eventuality. Many Iranians have a positive impression of the United States and a dislike of their own regime, but it is very unlikely that they would react positively to an American attack or to an American-backed successor government.

Iranian attitudes towards the U.S. currently fall between two extremes. Iran and its people can seem rabidly anti-American, with a history of hostage takings and mobs continuing to chant “Death to America” on a weekly basis. American visitors to the country, however, report that such activities are almost *pro forma* by now, and a 2002 opinion poll in Tehran found that almost three-quarters of the population favors the resumption of direct Iran-U.S. talks. (The United States broke relations with Iran on April 7, 1980.) At the same time, visitors to Iran describe a proud and nationalistic people who retain skepticism about U.S. motives, and opinion polls reflect this.

The United States could mitigate the impact of any military action against Iran by persuading Iranians beforehand of its positive intentions towards them, and this will take more than White House declarations of support for the Iranian people. This chapter recommends several concrete actions to win Iranians’ hearts and minds. Washington should provide disaster relief to Iran, permit enhanced international cooperation in Iranian counternarcotics activities, assist Iranian HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment

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programs, and provide assistance to Iranian refugee support activities. Washington also should encourage Iranian participation in multilateral international fora and acknowledge Iran's concerns about regional developments, ease restrictions on Iranians' ability to visit the United States, and end its resistance to Iranian membership in the World Trade Organization.

All of these actions would be pointless if Iranians are not aware of them. Coupled with the concrete steps of the hearts and minds campaign, therefore, must be an aggressive information operations campaign that would counter Tehran's anti-American propaganda and disinformation. Accurate information about U.S. activities should be relayed to Iran via FM and shortwave radio, satellite television, and the Internet.

The policy recommendations in this chapter may not have a serious short-term effect because most foreign-policy decisionmaking in Iran is in the hands of a small elite. The impact of a hearts and minds campaign would be much more significant in a decade, as the 44.3 million Iranians who are under 30—roughly two-thirds of the population of 66.4 million—and who did not participate in such formative experiences as life under the pro-U.S. monarchy, activism in the 1978-79 revolution, or fighting in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, come of age.¹

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND THE GREAT SATAN

It is unrealistic to be very specific about the attitudes of a population as large as Iran's, but for many observers, a number of images stand out—blindfolded American diplomats being led out of the Embassy in Tehran in 1979 and a cleric toying with the remains of an American serviceman killed in the April 1980 hostage rescue mission, burning of the American flag at public events, and Friday prayer congregations chanting "Death to America." Then there is the description of the United States as "the Great Satan."²

The Satanic reference to the United States was more than just a comparison to the Devil. It was an "important device in the reeducation of the Iranian people to the new revolutionary ideology of the Iranian state"—a lamentation that materialism had replaced spiritualism and the assignment of blame to the United States.³ The

Great Satan drew men from the path of righteousness towards sin. The Iranian monarch, his family, and his entourage were corrupt, but the United States was perceived as “the ultimate source of that corruption.”⁴ Moreover, Iran-U.S. relations were marred by misperceptions and misunderstanding.

The Great Satan terminology also reflected “outrage” directed against the United States. A scholar explained:

The outrage felt by the Iranian people was heightened by the knowledge, rarely admitted after the revolution, that many Iranians were themselves largely to blame for Iran’s economic and social difficulties during the years of Pahlavi rule.⁵

Some Iranians may chant against the Great Satan, but according to visitors, the Iranian public does not share the anti-American sentiments of its leadership. Journalist Elaine Sciolino developed a set of rules to help her “survive the setbacks and embrace the surprises of Iran,” and rule number 12 is, “Iranians Like Americans.”⁶ She notes that Iran officially sees America as its greatest enemy, but at the same time, many Iranians see America as the Promised Land. Sciolino cites the popularity of inexpensive pirated software, CDs, and videos, the availability of knock-off Wrangler jeans in Qom, and the way in which individuals who demonstrated against America would ask her for help getting a visa. Throughout her book, furthermore, Sciolino notes that she is generally received with great warmth.

Two of Sciolino’s other rules, however, lead one to question this warmth. One rule is, “Hospitality Doesn’t Mean Openness,” and the other rule is, “Being Polite is Better than Telling the Truth.”⁷ These rules result in reservations about the depth of fondness for Americans that Sciolino describes.

Journalist Afshin Molavi has written about Iranians and their attitudes towards the United States, too. Molavi writes that as he is sitting in a park with the Friday Prayer sermon blasting anti-American vituperative in the background, a group of young women approaches him; one asks for help in completing a Green Card application and another describes her application to an American university.⁸ In another case, Molavi is watching a hard-liner rally

against the writers of an allegedly blasphemous play.⁹ The crowd is led in cries of “The Playwrights Must Die,” “Reform Means Blasphemy,” “Death to Israel,” and, of course, “Death to America.” After the rally, however, one of the more enthusiastic chanters approaches Molavi and asks, “How can I get a Green Card?”

Like Sciolino, Molavi recognizes that Iranians are sometimes economical with the truth and may not be completely forthcoming about their real feelings; in his words, “a remarkable ability to be evasive, tell half-truths, and lie outright.”¹⁰ He describes this as a survival mechanism. And the quest for Green Cards appears to be associated with the quest for better economic opportunities and greater social freedom. Indeed, many younger Iranians travel to Damascus to get Canadian visas for these very reasons and because American visas are relatively difficult to get.

Another American reporter who has traveled to Iran extensively since the Islamic revolution, Robin Wright, also notes the dichotomy of opinions towards the United States. In 1982 she encountered a group of Revolutionary Guards who were looking for Americans; when she reluctantly identified herself they wanted to know the score of the Nebraska-Oklahoma football game.¹¹ She also notes that thousands of Iranians, including some top government officials, were educated in the United States, and she describes the annual reunion of the Islamic Association of U.S. and Canadian Graduates.¹² Youthful participants at the annual rally to commemorate the seizure of the U.S. Embassy are bused in, and one tells Wright that he sees it as a day off from school, while many others say that if given a choice, they would rather watch an American movie.¹³ At the same rally, a young man asks Wright for help getting a visa to the United States.

Polls and surveys have been used in recent years to weigh public opinion. Iran’s Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance sponsored a series of polls in 2001 that used innovative means to explore Iranians’ sentiments on a range of issues (but not on attitudes towards other countries).¹⁴ Some 16,274 people in 28 cities participated in the polling, but it does not appear that such thoroughness is the norm.

The Ayandeh Research Institute and the Islamic Culture and Guidance Ministry’s National Institute for Research Studies and Opinion Polls conducted a survey in September 2002 which found

that 74.7 percent of Tehran residents favored negotiations with the United States, and 64.5 percent favored the resumption of Iran-U.S. talks.¹⁵ Yet 70.4 percent of respondents said that the United States is unreliable, 62 percent did not believe in Washington's sincerity in the anti-terrorism campaign, and 65.6 percent did not think that Washington is sincere in its defense of freedom and democracy.

Two later surveys provided contradictory results. A late-March 2003 telephone poll of Tehran residents found that 84 percent of respondents believe that Iran should continue its current policy of neutrality and noncooperation with the United States.¹⁶ A survey conducted 3 weeks later found that 83 percent of Tehran citizens distrust the U.S. Government, and 85 percent of those polled think of the United States as an "invading and colonial country."¹⁷

This reversal in attitudes towards the United States can be explained in several ways. The latter two surveys were conducted when U.S. forces were participating in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (which started on March 20, 2003), and most Iranian newspapers were not published from March 20-April 5, due to the Noruz (the Iranian new year) holiday. During this period the only readily available sources of information were Iranian radio and television, which produced highly critical, biased, and inaccurate reports about the war. *Entekhab*, *Iran*, *Aftab-i Yazd*, and *Yas-i No* newspapers produced a few special issues during this period, but these, too, were generally critical of the war effort and played up the negative aspects of the conflict. Although the survey results were made available, furthermore, information on the sample size or survey technique was not reported.

There are questions about the September 2002 survey, too. During the pollsters' trial, the public prosecutor charged some of the defendants with forging the poll's results, completing questionnaires without questioning anybody, not actually visiting some of the addresses that they listed, and sometimes listing addresses that did not exist.¹⁸ Needless to say, being charged with a crime does not make a person guilty, nor can one view the trial relating to the poll as much more than a political event.

Iranians are friendly towards Americans and favorably inclined towards the United States, but they are also nationalistic and favor

their independence. These sentiments are to some extent rooted in the country's history of encounters with foreign invaders and neo-colonialists. Therefore, President George W. Bush's inclusion of Iran in his January 2002 "axis of evil" reference was insulting to many Iranians, although the Iranian legislature later questioned the Defense Minister about activities that contributed to this statement. "Iranians' fierce nationalism is characterized by intense suspicion and outright resentment of outside influences," a former Iranian official writes, and he warns, "any U.S. strategy that even remotely raises the specter of foreign interference in Iran is doomed to fail."¹⁹

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States can enact several measures that would build on the pre-existing positive sentiments described above. The ones listed below would have negligible costs for the United States. These policy recommendations could be enacted immediately, but it would take some time for them to have an impact.

Disaster Relief.

The United States should continue to provide disaster relief for Iran. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in March 1997 provided \$25,000 to the International Federation of the Red Cross to assist victims of Ardabil Province earthquakes that killed almost 1,000 people, injured 2,600, and left more than 60,000 people homeless.²⁰

The United States also provided assistance in May 1997 after an earthquake measuring 7.1 on the Richter scale caused devastation in Khorasan Province. In June 2002 an earthquake measuring 6.3 on the Richter scale killed more than 230 people, injured another 1,300, and left an estimated 25,000 people homeless. USAID sent \$350,000 worth of humanitarian aid (water containers, water purification systems, blankets, and personal hygiene kits) to Iran via a chartered aircraft, and provided another \$50,000 to International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to provide blankets to the victims.²¹

Iran's Sistan va Baluchistan Province is badly affected by

drought, and the main source of water there is the Helmand River, which originates in Afghanistan. The Taliban essentially blocked the river's flow into Iran, and, although the situation improved in Autumn 2002 due the improved relationship between Tehran and Kabul, Iranians continue to bemoan the relative scarcity of water. The United States could encourage Kabul to be more generous with the river's waters.

Counternarcotics Cooperation.²²

Tehran claims that up to 2 million Iranians are addicted to or abuse drugs, and drug-related convictions account for 40 percent of the prison population. American nongovernmental organizations already have provided assistance for addiction treatment and counseling. Washington could underwrite such activities. Moreover, club drugs such as ecstasy (MDMA) are becoming popular in Iran, and the United States could share its experiences in dealing with this new phenomenon.

Most of the drugs come from Afghanistan, the world's largest opium producer, and Tehran's main way of dealing with this problem is interdiction—static defenses, law enforcement, and military measures. Tehran has promoted crop substitution in Afghanistan and is providing counternarcotics training for its neighbors, and these are areas in which Iran and the United States could cooperate. The UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC, previously the UN Drug Control Program) has an office in Tehran and is actively involved with Iran's Drug Control Headquarters. U.S. legislation (the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, see below), namely the requirement that the United States reduce its contribution to an international program in a proportionate share to its contribution to Iran, can and should be waived in order to facilitate such cooperation.

HIV/AIDS Prevention and Treatment.

The first case of AIDS in Iran was reported in 1987. Some 4,846 people in Iran have been diagnosed as HIV-positive as of mid-2003, although there are unofficial estimates that up to 23,000 people

in the country have AIDS.²³ Iran's problem with narcotics is the main reason for the prevalence of the virus, with the sharing of contaminated needles, especially in prisons, accounting for 65 percent of the cases. So far, the main Iranian solution to this problem has been to separate addicted prisoners from those who are jailed for narcotics offenses.²⁴

Iran's wider approach focuses mainly on prevention through the provision of information and educational materials to patients and the community; voluntary testing and counseling; serological and behavioral surveillance; and HIV care, support, and treatment. Moreover, related medicine is distributed free of charge. The World Health Organization (WHO) provides support to the Iranian Ministry of Health, Treatment, and Medical Education's program to control HIV/AIDS. This program includes blood screening, health promotion and education, training workshops; and developing local capacities, expertise, and awareness among public health workers. Washington could facilitate public health professionals' travel to Iran to participate in intellectual exchanges, and it could make more money available for the WHO activities.

Refugee Assistance.

Iran currently hosts some 2.55 million refugees—2,355,000 Afghans, 203,000 Iraqis, and 5,522 others. The government, which is facing an estimated 25 percent unemployment rate, has enacted a number of policies to encourage the refugees to go home because they supposedly take jobs that would otherwise go to Iranians, they consume social services, and they supposedly contribute to the crime rate. These measures include forcible repatriation, the withdrawal of services (ex: children's education, health care), and the refusal to permit Afghan husbands of Iranian women to stay in Iran. Employers who hire refugees who do not have a work permit face heavy fines.

The United States could provide assistance to Iranian refugee support activities through the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Not only would this help the refugees, but also it would ease the pressure on the Transitional Administration of Afghanistan and on the fledgling Iraqi leadership. Indeed, in 2000

the United States provided the UNHCR with \$7.4 million to support its activities on behalf of Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, and it provided a nongovernmental organization called the International Rescue Committee with \$905,349 to assist repatriation of Afghan refugees from Iran and Pakistan.

Multilateral Dialogue.

The encouragement of Iranian participation in multilateral international fora and acknowledgement of Iranian concerns in bilateral meetings has taken place before and should continue. The most recent example is the meeting of American and Iranian officials to discuss the war in Iraq.²⁵ Tehran has been praised for its role in the November 2001 meeting in Bonn, Switzerland, about Afghanistan, and it was seen as an important participant in the UN's 6+2 grouping (Afghanistan's immediate neighbors, the United States, and Russia).

Iran first offered to mediate between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh in 1992-1993. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Minsk Group, which is chaired by France, the United States, and Russia and is spearheading the peace process, suggested in early 2001 that Tehran should be informed of progress. As a French diplomat explained:

[Our aim is] to keep the Iranian authorities informed and to make it clear to them that no one will be kept aside. We certainly do not want to give the impression that we are acting against the interests of one or another country in the region. There cannot be a stable and long-lasting peace if it is not endorsed by all regional countries.²⁶

A similarly inclusive approach in other regional fora, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, would demonstrate an interest in and consideration towards Iranian concerns.

Visa Regulations and Travel Restrictions.

The treatment of Iranian visitors to the United States should be modified in some way. Greater concern about homeland security in

the post-September 11, 2001, environment is normal and acceptable, but the Iranian regime plays up the difficulties Iranians encounter in getting visas and in actually trying to enter the United States.

A group of senior clerics associated with Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi accepted an invitation to participate in a December 1999 conference at Georgetown University but withdrew when immigration officials at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York tried to fingerprint and photograph them. Iranian filmmaker Jafar Panahi, who was detained at John F. Kennedy Airport in April 2001 for not having a transit visa, complained publicly that he was mistreated and chained like a medieval prisoner. In February 2000 an Iranian wrestling team complained bitterly about the fingerprinting, and in May 2001 it boasted about the absence of fingerprinting.

A U.S. consular presence in Iran, which has not existed since 1979, would facilitate the visa application process and possibly reduce such events. The United States should continue to push for this, although it seems unlikely. In November 1999, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Hussein Khamenei explained that Tehran rejected such a proposal because “they [the Americans] want to open an intelligence-political site in Tehran to make contact with sold-out elements.”²⁷ In January 2000 the director of the Kish Free Trade Zone said that a U.S. application to open a consulate there would be viewed favorably, but the Foreign Minister countered by saying, “we have a clear position towards the United States. We have no relations with the United States to talk about the opening of a U.S. consulate in any part of the country.”²⁸

World Trade Organization (WTO) Membership.

Iran first sought WTO membership in 1996, and in July 2001 the White House declared that its opposition to Iranian membership is “under review.” WTO decisionmaking is based on consensus, and the United States has blocked Iran’s application consistently (most recently in February 2002).²⁹ Other countries, such as France and the European Union, reportedly support Iranian membership, while the German Economics Minister pointed out that a normalization of ties with the United States would have to precede a successful

membership application.³⁰

There is domestic opposition to Iranian WTO membership, too. Unions have protested against membership on the grounds that it would lead to job losses.³¹ Opposition also comes from leftists who favor a state-run economy, hardline isolationists, and conservative traditional merchants who want to maintain import controls because they have favorable licensing arrangements. A Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology official accused “unnamed parties” of blocking the country’s WTO application.³² The head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Customs Administration (IRICA) also has noted that certain organizations, which he refused to identify, oppose joining the WTO because removal of tariff barriers and subsidies would eliminate their advantage.³³

Iranian officials normally blame the United States regarding the WTO issue. Washington would eliminate this grievance by allowing Iranian membership. Just as importantly the role of the state in the economy would be reduced and privatization would progress. Iranian economic interaction with the rest of the world would increase, and as Iranians recognize this interdependence they would have a greater interest in reducing actions that alienate the country from the international community.

POLICY CONSTRAINTS: THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE LAW

Any initiatives will require awareness of U.S. policy towards Iran, which was spelled out in several statements from the White House. President George W. Bush in a January 2002 statement specified a desired change in Iranian behavior.³⁴

Well, first of all, Iran must be a contributor in the war against terror; that our nation and our fight against terror will uphold the doctrine, either you’re with us or against us; and any nation that thwarts our ability to rout terror out where it exists will be held to account, one way or the other.

As Iranian students held demonstration in July 2002, President Bush specified another aspect of U.S. policy on Iran.³⁵ “The people of Iran want the same freedoms, human rights, and opportunities

as people around the world," he said. "Their government should listen to their hopes." The President added, "As Iran's people move towards a future defined by greater freedom, greater tolerance, they will have no better friend than the United States of America."

"The United States wants to see a democratic and prosperous Iran, integrated into the global economy," a top National Security Council (NSC) official said in an August 2002 speech.³⁶ He said that U.S. policy towards Iran follows two tracks, one of which publicly identifies the unacceptable aspects of Iranian behavior—"sponsorship of terror, pursuit of WMD, and repression of the clearly expressed desires of the Iranian people for freedom and democracy." The other track lays out a vision of partnership and support for the Iranian people.

U.S. policy is not about imposing change on Iran, but it will support Iranians' quest for self-determination, the NSC official said.³⁷ Nor is U.S. policy about factions or individuals in the Iranian governmental apparatus.

U.S. policy is . . . about supporting those who want freedom, human rights, democracy, and economic and educational opportunity for themselves and their fellow countrymen and women.

In addition to White House policies, several laws and regulations impose restrictions and limits on possible initiatives regarding Iran. Only one of these laws, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-195), is relevant to the policy recommendations discussed above.³⁸ This act bans U.S. foreign assistance to governments supporting international terrorism, and the State Department has identified Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism since January 1984.³⁹

Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 states that Iran and other state sponsors of terrorism cannot benefit from U.S. contributions to international organizations. The United States would reduce its contribution to the international program in a proportionate share. This means that U.S. contributions to the UNODC are reduced in proportion to UNODC contributions to Iranian counternarcotics activities. U.S. contributions to UNICEF and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are exempt from this restriction, and this provision does not apply to disaster

relief aid. Section 620A permits the President to waive the restrictions if this is in the national interest.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The recommendations in the previous section could have an impact on Iran at the grass-roots level and especially among people who have had little prior interaction with Americans. The recommendations will not be very effective, however, if the Iranian public does not know that the United States is responsible. For example, the earthquake assistance that the United States provided in 2002 was delivered by chartered aircraft and by non-U.S. crews. And if Iran does gain WTO membership, Tehran will almost certainly claim that this is a diplomatic victory for it and another reflection of failed U.S. efforts to isolate it.

Getting this information to the Iranian public will not be easy due to serious media restrictions. The official Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) runs all the radio and television stations, and its hard-line bias often is criticized by Iranians themselves.

Foreign radio stations that broadcast in the Persian language are very popular in Iran, because they provide relatively unbiased news about international events, offer a platform for Iranians who do not have access to state media, and in one case, carry entertaining programs. Among these foreign stations are the British Broadcasting Corporation, Deutsche Welle, Radio France International, Kol Yisrael, Radio Beijing, NHK Radio Japan, Voice of America, and Voice of Russia.

The U.S.-sponsored Radio Farda began broadcasting to Iran in December 2002, having replaced the 4-year-old Persian Service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Radio Farda is on the air 24 hours a day and is available via FM, shortwave, and satellite signal. Its target audience is the under-30 population, so it broadcasts pop music to attract these listeners. It also has 15-minute newscasts at the top of the hour 20 times a day and 3-minute newscasts at the half-hour 20 times a day. Four times a day it transmits 30-minute newsmagazines.

Satellite television is popular. The impact of Los Angeles-based stations that are run by Iranian expatriates, such as Pars TV and

NITV, was demonstrated in the week starting October 21, 2001, when NITV urged Iranians to take to the streets to protest against the government. Iranians actually did so, rioting after losing a World Cup soccer qualifying match. They chanted slogans against the government and destroyed property. During several days of demonstrations in Tehran in June 2003, satellite broadcasts again urged Iranians to take to the streets and to confront the regime's security forces.

Not only is satellite television popular, it is illegal.⁴⁰ There are periodic police sweeps in which satellite dishes are confiscated, and at the end of April 2003 President Hojatoleslam Seyyed Mohammad Khatami-Ardakani and Speaker of Parliament Hojatoleslam Mehdi Karrubi complained about unauthorized jamming of satellite television signals.⁴¹ Reporters Without Borders noted the jamming of foreign television and radio signals in June 2003.⁴² As satellite receiving equipment becomes smaller and less expensive, it will become more readily available to the Iranian public, thereby making it easier to communicate directly with the Iranian people.

The Iranian print media also operates under numerous restrictions, the most onerous being the undefined "red-lines," the crossing of which often leads to a publication's closure.⁴³ The courts have closed approximately 80 publications since April 2000, and Reporters Without Borders refers to Iran as "the biggest jail for journalists in the Middle East" in its annual report for 2002.⁴⁴

One of the means by which Iranians are overcoming the state's attempt to monopolize information sources is by turning to the Internet. Persian language websites (for example, *www.rooznegar.com*, *www.emrooz.org*, *www.alliran.net*), as well as foreign news sources, are increasingly popular with Iranians. Iranians also exchange information in chat rooms and blogs. The Minister of Post, Telegraph, and Telephone estimated that 15 million Iranians would have access to the Internet by March 2005.⁴⁵ The Internet, therefore, is another way to publicize U.S. initiatives.

Constant monitoring of Iranian media, interviews with Iranians living in the United States, and traveler surveys would provide the necessary input on the effectiveness of the recommended initiatives. This, in turn, would facilitate making adjustments to those initiatives that are having the desired effect, elimination of the ineffective ones,

and adoption of new ones.

CONCLUSION

The United States cannot ignore Iran and hope that Tehran's attitudes will soften and its behavior change with time, because of the threat it will pose in the near future. Iran is pursuing programs to produce nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, regardless of its status in the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).⁴⁶ Most Intelligence Community agencies believe that the United States will face an ICBM threat from Iran by 2015, and Iran's missile inventory already is among the largest in the Middle East.⁴⁷ Iran remained "the most active state sponsor of terrorism during 2002," according to the U.S. State Department's annual *Patterns of Global Terrorism—2002* report, providing support for violent groups such as Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ).

The policy recommendations described above are unlikely to affect Iranian strategic thinking or its international behavior in the short-term. But these steps will resonate with young Iranians who were born after the revolution and who have become disenchanted and frustrated with their country's rulers. These individuals hope for a better future, and a hearts and minds campaign will persuade them that the United States is a friend that wants to help them achieve that future. Such a campaign is, furthermore, in line with the Bush administration's policy of supporting the Iranian people.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. According to the UN Population Division, the population in 2000 was 66.43 million; <http://esa.un.org/unpp/p2k0data.asp>. The Central Intelligence Agency's World Factbook estimates that as of July 2002, the population was 66,622,704.

2. Mark J. Roberts, "Iran and the 'Great Satan,'" *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 1995.

3. William Beeman, "Images of the Great Satan: Representations of the United States in the Iranian Revolution," in Nikkie R. Keddie, ed., *Religion and Politics in*

- Iran-Shi'ism from Quietism to Revolution*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983, pp. 191, 192.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 216.
 5. *Ibid.*, p. 201.
 6. Elaine Sciolino, *Persian Mirrors—The Elusive Face of Iran*, New York: The Free Press, 2000, pp. 28, 43-45.
 7. *Ibid.*, pp. 29, 34.
 8. Afshin Molavi, *Persian Pilgrimages—Journeys Across Iran*, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2002, pp. 79-82.
 9. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-104.
 10. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
 11. Robin Wright, *The Last Great Revolution*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000, p. xv.
 12. *Ibid.*, p. 194.
 13. *Ibid.*, pp. 252-253.
 14. Nazgol Ashouri, "Polling in Iran: Surprising Questions," *Policywatch* #757, The Washington Institute of Near East Policy, May 14, 2003.
 15. Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), September 22, 2002. Iran's press corps accused Ayandeh Research Institute of taking money from the Washington-based Gallup Organization to fabricate the poll. Richard Burkholder, director of international polling at Gallup, told RFE/RL's Persian Service that Gallup is a private company and is not connected with the U.S. Government; and when Gallup pays foreign companies to conduct polls, they use questions and methodology developed by Gallup. National Institute for Research and Opinion Polls director Behruz Geranpayeh said that the Iranian legislature's research center commissioned the survey; IRNA, December 31, 2002.
 16. Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA), March 23, 2003.
 17. The Iranian Students Opinion Polls Center conducted the survey; IRNA, April 14, 2003.
 18. Public prosecutor's office representative Ali Asqar Tashakori discussing

Vahid Sinai and Mehdi Abbasirad, cited by IRNA, December 31, 2003.

19. Jahangir Amuzegar, "Iran's Crumbling Revolution," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2003.

20. USAID Press Release, March 10, 1997.

21. *Ibid.*, July 3, 2002, U.S. State Department's Office of International Information Programs, *usinfo.state.gov*.

22. See A. William Samii, "Drug Abuse: Iran's 'Thorniest Problem,'" *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Winter/Spring 2003.

23. Health Ministry public relations department chief Hushmand Sefidi, cited by IRNA, May 22, 2003; Health Ministry official Mohammad Mehdi Guya, cited by IRNA, May 20, 2003.

24. Prisons Organization chief Morteza Bakhtiari, cited by IRNA, January 16, 2003.

25. National Security Council official Zalmay Khalilzad and U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ryan Crocker reportedly met with Iran's representative to the United Nations, Mohammad Javad Zarif, and/or other senior Iranian officials and Islamic Revolution Guards Corps officers in January and March; UPI, March 26, 2003, and *The Washington Post*, April 18, 2003. Tehran denied that any discussions occurred, with Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi saying that Iran is not ready for the restoration of diplomatic relations with the United States, "because the United States is not ready for the kind of relations based on mutual respect among countries;" AP, April 21, 2003.

26. Former French Ambassador to Tehran and Minsk Group co-Chairman Philippe de Suremain, in an interview with Jean-Christophe Peuch, "Iran Offers To Mediate In Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute," RFE/RL Weekday Magazine, July 25, 2001.

27. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's speech to students and staff of Sharif University in Tehran, Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, November 22, 1999.

28. Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, cited by IRNA, January 24, 2000.

29. Frances Williams, "Iran's bid to join WTO is blocked by U.S.," *Financial Times*, February 14, 2002.

30. IRNA, April 9, 2003, April 17, 2003. German Economics Minister Werner Mueller, cited by IRNA, August 15, 2002.

31. IRNA, November 9, 2001.

32. Mohammad Nahavandian, cited by IRNA, October 22, 2002.

33. IRICA President Masud Karbasian, interview with *Hamshahri*, October 20, 2002.

34. Remarks by the President in a meeting with his economic team, The Oval Office, January 10, 2002, U.S. Department of State's Office of International Information Programs, *usinfo.state.gov*.

35. Statement by the President, July 12, 2002, U.S. State Department's Office of International Information Programs, *usinfo.state.gov*.

36. Special assistant to the president and senior director for Southwest Asia, Near East and North Africa on the National Security Council Zalmay Khalilzad's speech at the Washington Institute of Near East Policy, August 2, 2002, U.S. State Department's Office of International Information Programs, *usinfo.state.gov*.

37. *Ibid.*

38. Kenneth Katzman, *U.S.-Iran Relations: An Analytic Compendium of U.S. Policies, Laws, and Regulations*, The Atlantic Council of the United States Occasional Paper, December 1990, pp. 59-63.

39. State sponsorship means that Iran provides terrorists with safe-haven, travel documents, arms, training, and technical expertise, state support, or toleration.

40. A good study on this issue is Steven Barraclough, "Satellite Television in Iran: Prohibition, Imitation, and Reform," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 37, n. 3, July 2001.

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