Arguing that U.S. policies favoring nuclear promotion are not matched by corresponding policies on nonproliferation, Henry Sokolski,  Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, and Victor Gilinsky, former member of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, will propose several nonproliferation principles for correcting the mismatch.

Date: Wednesday, September 19
Time: 10:00-11:30 a.m.
Location: Harvard University, Cambridge, MA

For more information click here

Time: 11am-12pm

Location: Institute of World Politics, Washington, DC 20036

NPEC's executive director will be presenting "The Next Arms Race" to IWP's summer internship program students.

NPEC released the preliminary findings of its two-year project on nuclear nonproliferation policy, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Moving Beyond Pretense at the event.

Date: Monday, July 23, 2012
Registration & Lunch: 11:45 AM
Panel & Discussion: 12:00 PM-1:30 PM
Location: Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC

To view a video of the event and a list of speakers, click here.

Henry Sokolski spoke at the Center for Strategic and International Studies to discuss the Department of Energy's decision to fund the US Enrichment Corporation (USEC), URENCO, AREVA, and possibly SILEX based on a set of what it calls compelling national security considerations.

The panel also included Drew Walter of the House Armed Services Committee, Jonathan Epstein of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Mark Holt of the Congressional Research Service. Sharon Squassoni, Senior Fellow and Director of the Proliferation Prevention Program at CSIS, moderated. 

Date: June 25, 2012
Time: 1:30 pm to 3:00 pm
Location: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC

The US-Korea Nuclear Working Group held a discussion on "Closing the Fuel Cycle in Asia: The Security Implications", on June 6, 2012.  Henry Sokolski, the Executive Director for the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), lead a talk on the security implications of closed fuel cycles in Asia.

While the merits of closing the nuclear fuel cycle are normally debated in technical and economic terms, security issues are often set aside as secondary concerns in such discussions. South Korea, Japan, and China have long expressed interest in developing nuclear reprocessing, and have generally justified their aspirations on the basis of energy security and waste management considerations. However, given the relatively perilous security environment that currently exists in Pacific Asia, there are those who argue that recycling technologies are also coveted as a means to build latent nuclear weapons capabilities and that the proliferation of such technologies would heighten regional instability. According to this perspective, the promotion of natural gas and grid efficiency measures would best address the energy problems of the countries in question. This alternate solution, in conjunction with enhanced security coordination and arms control efforts, would presumably alleviate pressures to develop closed fuel cycles. With a rising China, an uncertain future in North Korea, and fears of declining US commitment to the region, ascertaining intentions and allaying both energy and national security concerns will be critical to Asia’s future.