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More of NPEC’s Work
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Greater Middle East & Africa
Sep 10, 2013 Greg Jones: Tehran Could Get Its First Bomb Now in Just Six Short Weeks
  In various papers since 2008, this author has outlined how Iran’s growing centrifuge enrichment program could provide it with the ability to produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and thereby the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. On August 28, 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published its latest safeguards update which shows that Iran is continuing to expand its enrichment program.     
Working Papers
Aug 27, 2013 National Review Online Posts NPEC Analysis, "Syria: America's First Hot Shot in a New Cold War?"
   
Op-Eds & Blogs
Jul 24, 2013 Iran's New President: Implications for the United States
Presentations; Audio & Video
May 30, 2013 Greg Jones: Iranian Uranium Enrichment Passes into Israel's Redline
In various papers since 2008, this author has outlined how Iran's growing centrifuge enrichment program could provide it with the ability to produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and thereby the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. On May 22, 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published its latest safeguards update, which shows that Iran has continued the rapid expansion of its enrichment program. 
Working Papers
Apr 11, 2013 NPEC's executive director testifies to Joint House Subcommittee Hearing, "Breaking the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nexus"
Prepared testimony of NPEC's executive director to an April 11, 2013 hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, "Breaking the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nexus." 
Testimony & Transcripts
Apr 08, 2013 Robert Zarate: The Non-Use and Abuse of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence in the Cases of North Korea and Iran
One of the key assumptions shared by backers of military counter-proliferation is that with enough timely intelligence, the U.S. and its key allies can bomb, interdict, sabotage, and otherwise neutralize the nuclear weapons efforts of proliferating states. The presumption here is that it is the supply of intelligence, rather than the timely use and demand for it from policy makers and military planners, that is preventing more robust counter-proliferation activity. At some level this certainly must be true. Yet, in the important current cases of Iran and North Korea, it is nowhere near as important as the demand problem. The attached NPEC-commissioned study by Robert Zarate, Policy Director of the Foreign Policy Initiative, "The Non-Use and Abuse of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence: The Cases of North Korea and Iran," makes this case forcefully. His conclusion, after detailing what is known about how we have used the intelligence we had on these programs, is that if we are unwilling to act on the basis of early proliferation information when only modest actions are needed, it is a mistake to assume we will be more likely to act later when more heroic measures are required.
Working Papers
Mar 19, 2013 Greg Jones: Iran Could Get Two Bombs in Four Months
In various papers since 2008, this author has outlined how Iran’s growing centrifuge enrichment program could provide it with the ability to produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and thereby the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. On February 21, 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published its latest safeguards update which shows that Iran has continued its rapid expansion of its enrichment program.  
Working Papers
Dec 30, 2012 Victor Gilinsky & Roger Mattson: Revisiting the NUMEC Affair
 Originally published in the spring of 2010. 
Articles
Oct 22, 2012 Henry Sokolski in the NRO: "Romney Must Get His Nuclear Redlines Right"
Op-Eds & Blogs
Sep 10, 2012 Greg Jones: Is the West Playing a Game With Iran That It Has Already Lost?
As Iran's nuclear program progresses, policy and opinion makers have crowded the airwaves pleading either to negotiate a "solution" or, more recently, to bomb or sanction Iran's nuclear activities away. The presumption is that the "window of vulnerability" for Iran's nuclear-weapons related activities has not quite closed, and that there's still time before Tehran "gets" the bomb.     This, however, may be wishful thinking. In his most recent analysis of Iran's nuclear activities, "Is the West Playing a Game With Iran That It Has Already Lost?", NPEC's Senior Researcher, Greg Jones, makes a convincing case that negotiating a deal with Iran or launching a military strike to prevent it from acquiring a quickly reconstitutable bomb option is no longer possible. As for sanctions, they are unlikely to block Iran's further nuclear progress.     This, Jones argues, may explain why, after a year of Israeli agitation for a military strike and extensive international efforts to cut a diplomatic deal with Iran, nothing has happened.     Jones' key recommendation, and one that has received far too little attention, is that the U.S. and other key nuclear supplier states focus on preventing future Irans. Specifically, Jones recommends that the strictures against making nuclear fuel contained in the United States-United Arab Emirates (UAE) civil nuclear cooperative agreement of 2009 be applied to all civilian nuclear cooperation with states that lack nuclear weapons. As Jones explains, if no action is taken to tighten existing nuclear controls, Iran and other states are likely to push ahead with "declared" nuclear fuel making activities producing a world full of Irans.
Working Papers
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The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), is a 501 (c)3 nonpartisan, nonprofit, educational organization
founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues. NPEC educates policymakers, journalists,
and university professors about proliferation threats and possible new policies and measures to meet them.
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