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More of NPEC’s Work
A chronological listing by resource:

Articles | Working Papers | Interviews | Official Docs & Letters | Op-Eds & Blogs | Press Releases | Presentations | Audio & Video | Testimony & Transcripts
 
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Greater Middle East & Africa
Dec 06, 2013 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Posts NPEC Analysis on the Iran Interim Agreement
The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists published a piece by Victor Gilinsky and Henry Sokolski that argues that after the interim agreement, which allows Iran to enrich to 5%, the U.S. will find it much more difficult to gain “gold standard” civilian nuclear agreements that require other states to forego any uranium enrichment. Additionally, the interim agreement does not take into account the fact that light water reactors can also be used to produce plutonium and therefore require more inspection. 
Op-Eds & Blogs
Nov 25, 2013 Judy Woodruff Interviews NPEC's Senior Researcher, Greg Jones
NPEC's senior researcher, Greg Jones, appeared on the PBS NewsHour on November 25 to discuss the interim agreement on Iran's nuclear program.
Interviews
Sep 19, 2013 NYT Publishes NPEC Piece, "Let's Be Honest about Israel's Nukes"
In this NY Times op-ed, NPEC's executive director, Henry Sokolski, and program advisor, Victor Gilinsky, argue that the U.S. policy of silence regarding Israel's alleged nuclear weapons impedes serious negotiations about weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
Op-Eds & Blogs
Sep 10, 2013 Greg Jones: Tehran Could Get Its First Bomb Now in Just Six Short Weeks
  In various papers since 2008, this author has outlined how Iran’s growing centrifuge enrichment program could provide it with the ability to produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and thereby the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. On August 28, 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published its latest safeguards update which shows that Iran is continuing to expand its enrichment program.     
Working Papers
Aug 27, 2013 National Review Online Posts NPEC Analysis, "Syria: America's First Hot Shot in a New Cold War?"
Preventing Assad from using chemical weapons will require massive air strikes or “boots on the ground” to eliminate Syria’s stockpiles. The best way to constrain Iranian behavior in the Middle East is not to allow it to win in Syria.  
Op-Eds & Blogs
Jul 24, 2013 Iran's New President: Implications for the United States
NPEC executive director participated in a panel discussion hosted by The Heritage Foundation on foreign policy implications for the United States of Iran's new government.   Date: July 24, 2013 Presentation: 12:00pm to 1:00pm Location: The Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC
Presentations; Audio & Video
May 30, 2013 Greg Jones: Iranian Uranium Enrichment Passes into Israel's Redline
In various papers since 2008, this author has outlined how Iran's growing centrifuge enrichment program could provide it with the ability to produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and thereby the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. On May 22, 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published its latest safeguards update, which shows that Iran has continued the rapid expansion of its enrichment program. 
Working Papers
Apr 11, 2013 NPEC's Executive Director Testifies to Joint House Subcommittee Hearing, "Breaking the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nexus"
Prepared testimony of NPEC's executive director to an April 11, 2013 hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, "Breaking the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nexus." 
Testimony & Transcripts
Apr 08, 2013 Robert Zarate: The Non-Use and Abuse of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence in the Cases of North Korea and Iran
One of the key assumptions shared by backers of military counter-proliferation is that with enough timely intelligence, the U.S. and its key allies can bomb, interdict, sabotage, and otherwise neutralize the nuclear weapons efforts of proliferating states. The presumption here is that it is the supply of intelligence, rather than the timely use and demand for it from policy makers and military planners, that is preventing more robust counter-proliferation activity. At some level this certainly must be true. Yet, in the important current cases of Iran and North Korea, it is nowhere near as important as the demand problem. The attached NPEC-commissioned study by Robert Zarate, Policy Director of the Foreign Policy Initiative, "The Non-Use and Abuse of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence: The Cases of North Korea and Iran," makes this case forcefully. His conclusion, after detailing what is known about how we have used the intelligence we had on these programs, is that if we are unwilling to act on the basis of early proliferation information when only modest actions are needed, it is a mistake to assume we will be more likely to act later when more heroic measures are required.
Working Papers
Mar 19, 2013 Greg Jones: Iran Could Get Two Bombs in Four Months
In various papers since 2008, this author has outlined how Iran’s growing centrifuge enrichment program could provide it with the ability to produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and thereby the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. On February 21, 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published its latest safeguards update which shows that Iran has continued its rapid expansion of its enrichment program.  
Working Papers
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The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), is a 501 (c)3 nonpartisan, nonprofit, educational organization
founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues. NPEC educates policymakers, journalists,
and university professors about proliferation threats and possible new policies and measures to meet them.
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