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More of NPEC’s Work
A chronological listing by resource:

Articles | Working Papers | Interviews | Official Docs & Letters | Op-Eds & Blogs | Press Releases | Presentations | Audio & Video | Testimony & Transcripts
 
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Greater Middle East & Africa
Sep 19, 2013 NYT Publishes NPEC Piece, "Let's Be Honest about Israel's Nukes"
In this NY Times op-ed, NPEC Executive Director Henry Sokolski and Program Adviser Victor Gilinsky argue that the U.S. policy of silence regarding Israel's alleged nuclear weapons impedes serious negotiations about weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
Op-Eds & Blogs
Sep 10, 2013 Greg Jones: Tehran Could Get Its First Bomb Now in Just Six Short Weeks
  In various papers since 2008, this author has outlined how Iran’s growing centrifuge enrichment program could provide it with the ability to produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and thereby the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. On August 28, 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published its latest safeguards update which shows that Iran is continuing to expand its enrichment program.     
Working Papers
Aug 27, 2013 National Review Online Posts NPEC Analysis, "Syria: America's First Hot Shot in a New Cold War?"
Preventing Assad from using chemical weapons will require massive air strikes or “boots on the ground” to eliminate Syria’s stockpiles. The best way to constrain Iranian behavior in the Middle East is not to allow it to win in Syria.  
Op-Eds & Blogs
Jul 24, 2013 Iran's New President: Implications for the United States
NPEC executive director participated in a panel at an event hosted by The Heritage Foundation on the foreign policy implications for the United States of Iran's new government.  
Presentations; Audio & Video
May 30, 2013 Greg Jones: Iranian Uranium Enrichment Passes into Israel's Redline
In various papers since 2008, this author has outlined how Iran's growing centrifuge enrichment program could provide it with the ability to produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and thereby the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. On May 22, 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published its latest safeguards update, which shows that Iran has continued the rapid expansion of its enrichment program. 
Working Papers
Apr 11, 2013 NPEC's executive director testifies to Joint House Subcommittee Hearing, "Breaking the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nexus"
Prepared testimony of NPEC's executive director to an April 11, 2013 hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, "Breaking the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nexus." 
Testimony & Transcripts
Apr 08, 2013 Robert Zarate: The Non-Use and Abuse of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence in the Cases of North Korea and Iran
One of the key assumptions shared by backers of military counter-proliferation is that with enough timely intelligence, the U.S. and its key allies can bomb, interdict, sabotage, and otherwise neutralize the nuclear weapons efforts of proliferating states. The presumption here is that it is the supply of intelligence, rather than the timely use and demand for it from policy makers and military planners, that is preventing more robust counter-proliferation activity. At some level this certainly must be true. Yet, in the important current cases of Iran and North Korea, it is nowhere near as important as the demand problem. The attached NPEC-commissioned study by Robert Zarate, Policy Director of the Foreign Policy Initiative, "The Non-Use and Abuse of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence: The Cases of North Korea and Iran," makes this case forcefully. His conclusion, after detailing what is known about how we have used the intelligence we had on these programs, is that if we are unwilling to act on the basis of early proliferation information when only modest actions are needed, it is a mistake to assume we will be more likely to act later when more heroic measures are required.
Working Papers
Mar 19, 2013 Greg Jones: Iran Could Get Two Bombs in Four Months
In various papers since 2008, this author has outlined how Iran’s growing centrifuge enrichment program could provide it with the ability to produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and thereby the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. On February 21, 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published its latest safeguards update which shows that Iran has continued its rapid expansion of its enrichment program.  
Working Papers
Dec 30, 2012 Victor Gilinsky & Roger Mattson: Revisiting the NUMEC Affair
Originally published in the spring of 2010. 
Articles
Oct 22, 2012 Henry Sokolski in the NRO: "Romney Must Get His Nuclear Redlines Right"
NPEC Executive Director argues that both Romney and Obama don't have their facts straight. Obama and Biden are wrong to argue that they will know when Iran develops a weapon in which to put enriched uranium, and to insinuate that the development of such weapons is a sufficient red line. Meanwhile, Romney makes a mistake in stating that Iran does not yet have enough enriched uranium to produce a weapon, which is false. Finally, Romney should explain how banning Iranian nuclear-fuel production entirely could serve as a basis for a more effective general nonproliferation policy. 
Op-Eds & Blogs
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The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), is a 501 (c)3 nonpartisan, nonprofit, educational organization
founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues. NPEC educates policymakers, journalists,
and university professors about proliferation threats and possible new policies and measures to meet them.
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