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Dec 30, 2012 |
Victor Gilinsky & Roger Mattson: Revisiting the NUMEC Affair
Victor Gilinsky and Roger Mattson review Israel's role in the NUMEC Affair of the early 1960s. Originally published in the Spring of 2010.
Articles
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Oct 22, 2012 |
Henry Sokolski in the NRO: "Romney Must Get His Nuclear Redlines Right"
NPEC's Executive Director argues that both Romney and Obama don't have their facts straight. Obama and Biden are wrong to argue that they will know when Iran develops a weapon in which to put enriched uranium, and to insinuate that the development of such weapons is a sufficient red line. Meanwhile, Romney makes a mistake in stating that Iran does not yet have enough enriched uranium to produce a weapon, which is false. Finally, Romney should explain how banning Iranian nuclear-fuel production entirely could serve as a basis for a more effective general nonproliferation policy.
Op-Eds & Blogs
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Sep 10, 2012 |
Greg Jones: Is the West Playing a Game With Iran That It Has Already Lost?
As Iran's nuclear program progresses, policy and opinion makers have crowded the airwaves pleading either to negotiate a "solution" or, more recently, to bomb or sanction Iran's nuclear activities away. The presumption is that the "window of vulnerability" for Iran's nuclear-weapons related activities has not quite closed, and that there's still time before Tehran "gets" the bomb.
This, however, may be wishful thinking. In his most recent analysis of Iran's nuclear activities, "Is the West Playing a Game With Iran That It Has Already Lost?", NPEC's Senior Researcher, Greg Jones, makes a convincing case that negotiating a deal with Iran or launching a military strike to prevent it from acquiring a quickly reconstitutable bomb option is no longer possible. As for sanctions, they are unlikely to block Iran's further nuclear progress.
This, Jones argues, may explain why, after a year of Israeli agitation for a military strike and extensive international efforts to cut a diplomatic deal with Iran, nothing has happened.
Jones' key recommendation, and one that has received far too little attention, is that the U.S. and other key nuclear supplier states focus on preventing future Irans. Specifically, Jones recommends that the strictures against making nuclear fuel contained in the United States-United Arab Emirates (UAE) civil nuclear cooperative agreement of 2009 be applied to all civilian nuclear cooperation with states that lack nuclear weapons. As Jones explains, if no action is taken to tighten existing nuclear controls, Iran and other states are likely to push ahead with "declared" nuclear fuel making activities producing a world full of Irans.
Working Papers & Monographs
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Jun 28, 2012 |
Matthew Fuhrmann: Preventive War and the Spread of Nuclear Programs
In Foreign Affair's most recent featured cover article, "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Be Stabilizing", the author, Ken Waltz, imagines a peaceful proliferated Persian Gulf. Putting aside the improbability of the kind of automatic nuclear balance the author presumes between Israel and Iran, Dr. Waltz ignores just how militarily provocative states' efforts to get the bomb have been.
This history is detailed and assessed in the attached NPEC-commissioned analysis by Dr. Matthew Furhmann of Texas A&M entitled, “Preventive War and the Spread of Nuclear Programs". It makes for sober reading. In the last three decades, the U.S., Israel, Iran, and Iraq have planned or executed preemptive military strikes against Israel, Iran, Iraq, Syria and North Korea. Over 10 military strikes were executed. Going back further in history, the list of serious preemptive strikes and plans is much longer.
It is also interesting to note that a good number of the targeted nuclear programs that Dr. Furhrmann's covers in his study were "peaceful" and safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency. This hardly argues well for the further expansion of nuclear power in the Middle East. It certainly is not the picture of proliferated "stability" that Dr. Waltz propounds.
Working Papers & Monographs
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Jun 13, 2012 |
Frank Gaffney Interviews Greg Jones on Iran's Progress with its Nuclear Program
Secure Freedom Radio's Frank Gaffney interviewed Greg Jones of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. Greg now calculates that Iran could produce a bomb, if it chose, in as little as 5-14 weeks.
Interviews; Audio & Video
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Jun 07, 2012 |
Greg Jones: Iran's Rapid Enrichment Progress
In Greg Jones' latest evaluation of the IAEA's May 25th Iran safeguards report, he notes that in the last six months, Iran increased its production of 3.5% enriched uranium by roughly 60%. In addition, Iran installed 1,000 new centrifuges at its fortified Fordow facility. As a result, Greg now calculates that Iran could produce a bomb, if it chose, in as little as five to fourteen weeks.
Working Papers & Monographs
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May 17, 2012 |
NPEC's Executive Director Briefs House Members on "Iran and the Bomb: What's to be Done"
Prepared Testimony from NPEC's Executive Director on May 17, 2012 to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, entitled "Iran and the Bomb: What's to be Done?"
Testimony & Transcripts
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May 15, 2012 |
Frank Gaffney Interviews Henry Sokolski on Iran's Nuclear Program
Secure Freedom Radio's Frank Gaffney interviewed Henry Sokolski of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. He explains the need for America to take a tougher stance against Iran’s nuclear program.
Interviews; Audio & Video
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May 14, 2012 |
Henry Sokolski in the NRO: "Iran: Obama's 5% Uranium Enrichment Solution is No Solution at All"
This article argues that President Obama’s concession to allow Iran to enrich uranium up to 5% would not only make it easier for Tehran to break out and make nuclear weapons whenever it wants, but also give Iran’s neighbors every reason to demand similar nuclear-fuel-making “rights.” To prevent a nuclear Iran, we need to make it clear to the mullahs that the costs of violating the NPT by acquiring or testing a nuclear device will be much higher than anything they have yet suffered.
Op-Eds & Blogs
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Mar 26, 2012 |
Greg Jones: Facing the Reality of Iran as a De Facto Nuclear State
NPEC Senior Researcher Greg Jones argues that Iran can produce a nuclear weapon in such a short amount of time that it should already be considered a de facto nuclear state. He also claims that neither sanctions, diplomacy, a military strike, nor any combination of these can prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Working Papers & Monographs
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