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Jun 07, 2012 |
Greg Jones: Iran's Rapid Enrichment Progress
In Greg Jones' latest evaluation of the IAEA's May 25th Iran safeguards report, he notes that in the last six months, Iran increased its production of 3.5% enriched uranium by roughly 60%. In addition, Iran installed 1,000 new centrifuges at its fortified Fordow facility. As a result, Greg now calculates that Iran could produce a bomb, if it chose, in as little as five to fourteen weeks.
Working Papers & Monographs
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May 17, 2012 |
NPEC's Executive Director Briefs House Members on "Iran and the Bomb: What's to be Done"
Prepared Testimony from NPEC's Executive Director on May 17, 2012 to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, entitled "Iran and the Bomb: What's to be Done?"
Testimony & Transcripts
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May 15, 2012 |
Frank Gaffney Interviews Henry Sokolski on Iran's Nuclear Program
Secure Freedom Radio's Frank Gaffney interviewed Henry Sokolski of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. He explains the need for America to take a tougher stance against Iran’s nuclear program.
Interviews; Audio & Video
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May 14, 2012 |
Henry Sokolski in the NRO: "Iran: Obama's 5% Uranium Enrichment Solution is No Solution at All"
This article argues that President Obama’s concession to allow Iran to enrich uranium up to 5% would not only make it easier for Tehran to break out and make nuclear weapons whenever it wants, but also give Iran’s neighbors every reason to demand similar nuclear-fuel-making “rights.” To prevent a nuclear Iran, we need to make it clear to the mullahs that the costs of violating the NPT by acquiring or testing a nuclear device will be much higher than anything they have yet suffered.
Op-Eds & Blogs
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Mar 26, 2012 |
Greg Jones: Facing the Reality of Iran as a De Facto Nuclear State
NPEC Senior Researcher Greg Jones argues that Iran can produce a nuclear weapon in such a short amount of time that it should already be considered a de facto nuclear state. He also claims that neither sanctions, diplomacy, a military strike, nor any combination of these can prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Working Papers & Monographs
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Feb 27, 2012 |
Bruno Tertrais: Nuclear Coup? France, the Algerian War and the April 1961 Nuclear Test
Bruno Tertrais examines the history surrounding France's April 1961 Nuclear Test and aims to draw lessons for possible future contingencies where a nuclear-capable country is threatened from inside and the control of nuclear materials or weapons may be at risk.
Working Papers & Monographs
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Feb 22, 2012 |
Edward L. Morse: Expecting the Unexpected: Oil in 2012 - A Year of Tail Risks
Edward L. Morse, Global Head of Commodity Research for Citigroup, gave this slide presetnation on oil price futures and Iran at an NPEC dinner seminar, "Militray Action in Gulf: What Might the Economic Knock-On Effects Be?"
Presentations
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Feb 14, 2012 |
NPEC's Executive Director Signs Letter to Urge Obama to Back Gold Standard
The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and the Foreign Policy Initiative worked together on a letter to the President asking him to reconsider his decision to abandon the "Gold Standard" in favor of a case-by-case review. The Gold Standard requires non-nuclear weapons states to forgo uranium enrichment as well as spent-fuel reprocessing, and open themselves up to intrusive international inspections. NPEC and FPI argue that dropping the gold standard approach undermines global non-proliferation efforts and emboldens Iran because if the U.S. is willing to allow Vietnam and Jordan to make nuclear fuel, how will it convince Iran to refrain from doing this?
Official Docs & Letters
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Feb 07, 2012 |
Obama Turns Bush's Nonproliferation Gold Standard into Lead
In an op-ed published by the National Review, NPEC's Executive Director looks into Obama's policy reversal and argues that leading and leaning on key nuclear suppliers to adopt the Gold Standard is our only option. Moreover, if the U.S. allows Jordan, Vietnam, South Korea, or Saudi Arabia to make nuclear fuel, it can forget about preventing any other country, including Iran, from doing so.
Op-Eds & Blogs
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Dec 06, 2011 |
Greg Jones: Earliest Date Possible for Iran's First Bomb, February 2012
Senior Researcher Greg Jones argues that the IAEA's safeguards update shows that Western efforts to impede Iran’s centrifuge enrichment program continue to be ineffective. Iran has maintained a steady production of 3.5% and 19.7% enriched uranium. The IAEA has also outlined the substantial progress Iran has made in the development of the non-nuclear components needed to produce nuclear weapons. If Iran were to now make an all-out effort to acquire nuclear weapons, it could probably do so in two to six months.
Working Papers & Monographs
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The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), is a 501 (c)3 nonpartisan, nonprofit,
educational organization
founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues. NPEC educates
policymakers, journalists,
and university professors about proliferation threats and possible new policies and measures to meet them. |
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1600 Wilson Blvd. | Suite 640 | Arlington, VA 22209 | phone: 571-970-3187 | webmaster@npolicy.org
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