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More of NPEC’s Work
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Russia
Jan 15, 2021 Moscow's Strategic Relations with New Delhi and Islamabad
Although it’s generally assumed that what matters most in determining Washington’s policies toward India and Pakistan is how China treats them, there is another way to view South Asia and that is how India and Pakistan relate strategically with Russia. How deep might Moscow’s military ties with India and Pakistan be and how, if at all, might Russian strategic nuclear thinking be shared with either? To get the answers, NPEC commissioned a series of studies, which the Air University’s Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs released late last week. It showcased research Dr. Sameer Lalwani, Dr. Frank O’Donnell, Tyler Sagerstrom, Akriti Vasudeva, Brig. General Feroz Khan (Pakistan Army retired), and Dr. Vipin Narang completed for NPEC. The analyses are quite detailed. Russian military assistance to India has been and remains massive. A vast majority of the weapons India deploys and is developing — whether it be hypersonic missiles, advanced missile defenses, space systems, nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers or tanks, fighters or bombers — are Russian. Since America opened up high-technology trade with India in 2005, New Deli’s military dependency on Moscow has hardly lessened. This suggests that hopes that India might buy American arms in any major way any time soon, need to be temped. It seems India cherishes its independence in security affairs at least as much as it might desire closer strategic security ties with the United States. This is especially true when it comes to strategic weapons systems such as air and missile defenses, nuclear submarines, hypersonic missiles, and space technology, all of which rely heavily on Russian exports. Russian military instruction of Indian personnel related to specific weapons systems is significant. As for strategic cooperation with Pakistan, Russia is now reaching out to it as well, making military sales and affording military training. Although there is no evidence yet that Russian military science has influenced Pakistani strategic planning, both Pakistan and India emphasize first and early use of nuclear weapons to respond to an overwhelming conventional attack. How Russian, Pakistani, and Indian strategic interests align should moderate optimism that the United States can easily play India against China or ignore Pakistan or Russia in trying to balance India strategically against Beijing.
Occasional Papers & Monographs
Jan 06, 2021 How to Think about Our Rivalry with China and Russia
On Wednesday, January 6, 2021, Henry Sokolski gave an interview with The John Batchelor Show. We’re trading a lot, at least with China; quite unlike the Cold War.  Another complication is that our ideological opposition to what's going on in China and Russia is a lot less than the fear and loathing were during the Cold War. Finally, our allies have reason to want to do business with them.  China’s and Russia’s militaries work hand in glove with each other. A change is that many people know the malice of China in intentionally releasing the virus, with over 300,000 deaths.  However, many of China’s trading partners want nothing to do with China’s strategic cooperation. South Korea wants to rejoin with the North; not fully [aligned] with Japan. India and Australia.  A lot of other stuff needs attending to beneath that. It's a lot more complicated than formerly. Space: does this moot the success of strategic arms treaties of the last century?  No.  . . . an upcoming period of US vulnerability is space. Deterrence: a different meaning from during Cold War; no longer based in seas, air, ground, but on eyes, ears, voice from space. Absent these, a sort of lobotomy.      
Interviews; Audio & Video
Nov 05, 2020 Three Neglected Space Issues: Laser ASATs, Cooperation with China and Russia, and Space Secrecy
Earlier this summer, NPEC and the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Law and National Security held their fifth space policy workshop, “Three Neglected Space Issues: Laser ASAT's, Cooperation with China and Russia, and Space Secrecy.” Attached is the workshop report. Very little has been said publicly about the Chinese and Russian ground-based anti-satellite weapon threat. The first panel clarified this threat. Like rendezvous satellites, ground-based lasers have perfectly legitimate civilian applications. However, they also can be used to disrupt, dazzle, and destroy important military satellites. Some technical fixes against this threat are possible. It also would be desirable to have certain rules governing the operations of these ground-based systems. Devising either set of fixes, however, are not possible without discussing these matters in a more open fashion. The second panel focused on how excessive secrecy is hobbling America’s military space programs and related space control diplomacy. The details of how self-defeating some forms of secrecy are and what should be done about it were extensively discussed. Finally, the third panel focused on space cooperation with Russia and China. What is the future of such cooperation? Might more cooperation help sort out rules for military space operations or is additional space cooperation ill-advised? On these matters, the participant’s views were divided: Some thought space cooperation was the best way to promote needed space control rules; others believed it would be unlikely China would ever comply. Below is the workshop’s report. The impressive list of speakers and participants included James Clapper, former director of national intelligence, Mike Rogers former Chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, Michael Gold, acting associate NASA administrator, and Simon “Pete” Worden of Breakthrough Initiatives.
Testimony & Transcripts
Oct 22, 2020 Lecture at the Mitchell Institute, "Strategic Deterrence: Its Future if the Bomb Spreads"
Just before this week's presidential election, Marshall Billingslea, the U.S. envoy for arms control, pleaded with NATO members not to share sensitive nuclear technology with China. He made this request to pressure Beijing to join nuclear arms negotiations with Washington and Moscow. Certainly, reaching limits on the future growth of Russian and Chinese nuclear forces is desirable. In China's case, special attention needs to be paid not just to how many warheads it has, but to how it might exploit its "peaceful" civilian nuclear infrastructure to ramp up those numbers. Limiting such a possible ramp up should have a more prominent place on America's arms control agenda. Mr. Billingslea's NATO plea is a start. What more is needed? Last week, Henry Sokolski spoke to this question before the Air Force Association's Nuclear Deterrence Breakfast Series. It is unclear just how large China plans to make its nuclear arsenal over the next decade. Compounding this uncertainty is China's latent capacity to make many hundreds of nuclear weapons by tapping existing and planned uranium enrichment and plutonium recycling plants. This possibility puts our Asian allies, Japan and South Korea, on edge. With any bad luck this could prompt them to go nuclear. To address this, the United States should propose a time-out on reprocessing and cap existing enrichment capacities at their current levels throughout the Pacific Rim, including the United States. Henry Sokolski makes a number of other suggestions at the close of his talk.  
Presentations; Audio & Video
Jun 25, 2020 "The Energy Department's Dangerous Plutonium Dream," The American Interest
Late last month, the Department of Energy (DoE) again floated the idea of chemically extracting or "reprocessing" nuclear weapons explosive plutonium from spent fuel reactor fuel. Why? To keep up with Russia and China in building multi-billion dollar fast "advanced" reactor commercial demonstration programs that make current expensive nuclear electricity look dirt cheap.  But as Victor Gilinsky and Henry Sokolski argue in "The Energy Department's Dangerous Plutonium Dream," published in The American Interest, following Moscow's and Beijing's command nuclear programs is a mistake. Russia and China are pushing fast reactors and reprocessing to "save" uranium left in spent reactor fuel, which they and DoE officials see as a resource that is being "wasted." This view, however, is like insisting that moonlight and ocean wave energy is going to "waste" because it has yet to be captured, while ignoring the fantastic costs needed to harness them. Uranium, in fact, is plentiful and dirt cheap. "Saving" it by reprocessing it and plutonium from spent fuel, on the ohter hand, is dangerous and extremely expensive.  Reprocessing and fast reactor proponents actually know this. That is why they are eager to internationalize commercial advanced fast reactor and fuel cycle demonstration projects. This includes exporting American spent reactor fuel to be reprocessed abroad in France, India, and even Japan. All of this will burn financial holes in our pockets and, if we are unlucky at all, help would be bomb makers. It surely is the wrong way to compete with Russia and China. 
Op-Eds & Blogs
Jun 16, 2019 Commercial Space: Space Controls and the Invisible Hand
This article reviewed three major projections of the global space industry by Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Bank of America Merrill Lynch and extracted the trands that would significantly impact the design of both the domestic and international space traffic management (STM) schemes. If found that, in the next two decades, the United States will have the largest market share in practically every space industrial sector. It suggests how the United States, as well as the West, can use its market power to incentivize Russia and Chinna to fall in line with a STM that provides peace and prosperity to all. It also proposed five measures as building blocks for developing standards, practices, regulations and laws for such STM.
Occasional Papers & Monographs
Mar 10, 2018 Tracking Emerging Asian Nuclear Weapons Doctrines - Presentations & Papers
As part of NPEC's project, "Tracking Emerging Asian Nuclear Weapons Doctrines," experts were commissioned to study the impact of Russian nuclear military doctrine on the doctrines of China and India. Below are presentations on the preliminary findings of this research.
Presentations
Jun 05, 2012 Scott Kemp: Centrifuges: A New Era for Nuclear Proliferation
NPEC asked Associate Research Scholar at Princeton University and a Former Science Advisor on nonproliferation for the U.S. Department of State Scott Kemp to write a study on centrifuges. Scott explains that centrifuge technology can be fairly easily developed in a matter of 36 months using a Soviet-like design and gives both technical and historical evidence for this.
Occasional Papers & Monographs
Mar 26, 2012 NPR's Talk of the Nation Interviews NPEC's Executive Director on the Future of Nuclear Weapons
On March 26, 2012 NPR's Talk of the Nation interviewed NPEC Executive Director Henry Sokolski on the topic of Defining Nuclear Security in Face of Modern Threats.
Interviews; Audio & Video
Feb 28, 2012 Nikolai Sokov: Controlling Soviet/ Russian Nuclear Weapons in Time of Instability
A paper by Nikolai Sokov discussed at NPEC's meeting, "Securing Nuclear Arsenals for the Next Half Century: What Does History Recommend?"
Occasional Papers & Monographs
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The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), is a 501 (c)3 nonpartisan, nonprofit, educational organization
founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues. NPEC educates policymakers, journalists,
and university professors about proliferation threats and possible new policies and measures to meet them.
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