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More of NPEC’s Work
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Working Papers & Monographs
Jun 28, 2012 Matthew Fuhrmann: Preventive War and the Spread of Nuclear Programs
In Foreign Affair's most recent featured cover article, "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb:  Nuclear Balancing Would Be Stabilizing", the author, Ken Waltz, imagines a peaceful proliferated Persian Gulf. Putting aside the improbability of the kind of automatic nuclear balance the author presumes between Israel and Iran, Dr. Waltz ignores just how militarily provocative states' efforts to get the bomb have been. This history is detailed and assessed in the attached NPEC-commissioned analysis by Dr. Matthew Furhmann of Texas A&M entitled, “Preventive War and the Spread of Nuclear Programs".  It makes for sober reading. In the last three decades, the U.S., Israel, Iran, and Iraq have planned or executed preemptive military strikes against Israel, Iran, Iraq, Syria and North Korea.  Over 10 military strikes were executed.  Going back further in history, the list of serious preemptive strikes and plans is much longer. It is also interesting to note that a good number of the targeted nuclear programs that Dr. Furhrmann's covers in his study were "peaceful" and safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency.  This hardly argues well for the further expansion of nuclear power in the Middle East. It certainly is not the picture of proliferated "stability" that Dr. Waltz propounds.
Jun 14, 2012 Patrick Roberts: Can IAEA Safeguards Work if Nuclear Power Grows?
NPEC recently commissioned a study, "How Well Will the IAEA Be Able to Safeguard More Nuclear Materials in More States?" by Patrick Roberts of Virginia Tech to examine the assumption that if the IAEA has proper access, it should be able to safeguard against diversions. Dr. Roberts has been studying the workings of the IAEA both here and overseas for nearly two years. His conclusion is that in many cases, IAEA safeguards may not be up to the task, and that the number of these occasions is likely to increase as nuclear plants are built in a larger number of countries unless fundamental reforms to the agency are made. Among his key recommendations are that the IAEA develop clearer performance metrics for its safeguards system, that the agency's authorities to inspect be increased, and that its safeguards efforts be backed not just with more resources, but with more predictable, firm enforcement measures by the United Nations Security Council.
Jun 07, 2012 Greg Jones: Iran's Rapid Enrichment Progress
In Greg Jones' latest evaluation of the IAEA's May 25th Iran safeguards report, he notes that in the last six months, Iran increased its production of 3.5% enriched uranium by roughly 60%. In addition, Iran installed 1,000 new centrifuges at its fortified Fordow facility. As a result, Greg now calculates that Iran could produce a bomb, if it chose, in as little as five to fourteen weeks.  
Jun 05, 2012 Scott Kemp: Centrifuges: A New Era for Nuclear Proliferation
NPEC asked Associate Research Scholar at Princeton University and a Former Science Advisor on nonproliferation for the U.S. Department of State Scott Kemp to write a study on centrifuges. Scott explains that centrifuge technology can be fairly easily developed in a matter of 36 months using a Soviet-like design and gives both technical and historical evidence for this.
May 26, 2012 Matthew Kroenig: The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?
NPEC asked Council on Foreign Relations Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow and Georgetown University assistant professor of government Matthew Kroenig to review the bidding.  His take and bottom line is that such nuclear optimism always was strained, that it remains far less popular out of academe than in and with cause. 
May 23, 2012 Olli Heinonen: IAEA Inspections in Perspective
 Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, presented this paper at a conference, "Reassessing the Assumptions Driving Our Current Nuclear Nonproliferation Policies," hosted by NPEC on May 21, 2012.
Apr 04, 2012 François Heisbourg: How Bad Would the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons Be?
François Heisbourg, chairman of IISS, presented a preliminary version of this paper at a conference, "Reassessing Nuclear Nonproliferation's Key Premises," cohosted by NPEC and the Legatum Institute in London, Great Britain, November 3-4, 2011.
Mar 26, 2012 Greg Jones: Facing the Reality of Iran as a De Facto Nuclear State
NPEC Senior Researcher Greg Jones argues that Iran can produce a nuclear weapon in such a short amount of time that it should already be considered a de facto nuclear state. He also claims that neither sanctions, diplomacy, a military strike, nor any combination of these can prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. 
Feb 28, 2012 Nikolai Sokov: Controlling Soviet/ Russian Nuclear Weapons in Time of Instability
A paper by Nikolai Sokov discussed at NPEC's meeting, "Securing Nuclear Arsenals for the Next Half Century: What Does History Recommend?"
Feb 28, 2012 Matthew Bunn: Beyond Crises: The Unending Challenge of Controlling Nuclear Weapons and Materials
A commentary by Matthew Bunn shared at NPEC's meeting, "Securing Nuclear Arsenals for the Next Half Century: What Does History Recommend?"
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The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), is a 501 (c)3 nonpartisan, nonprofit, educational organization
founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues. NPEC educates policymakers, journalists,
and university professors about proliferation threats and possible new policies and measures to meet them.
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