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Working Papers & Monographs
Jun 21, 2018 Intelligence and Policy Community Cooperation in the Libya WMD Disarmament Case (Occasional Paper 1802)
As the Trump Administration prepares to negotiate with North Korea, a question has arisen as to what model Washington should follow. National Security Advisor John Bolton has suggested that the Libyan nuclear case represents the best example to emulate. Given the violence Libya suffered after it disarmed, this recommendation provoked criticism, not only from the North Korean government, but a number of American analysts.    Anticipating the importance of this case, NPEC commissioned William Tobey, former Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration, to write a primary history. Mr. Tobey served on the National Security Council in the Bush (43) Administration when the Libyan nuclear case was being worked.    For his primary history, Tobey conducted extensive history. Shortly after it was completed, the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence presented him with the prestigious Studies in Intelligence Award for 2018. 
May 03, 2018 Avoiding a Nuclear Wild, Wild West in the Middle East (Working Paper 1801)
With the Trump Administration’s announcement last fall that it intended to negotiate a civil nuclear cooperative agreement with Saudi Arabia, a debate has ensued over how restrictive any such agreement should be over the enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of plutonium. These nuclear activities can bring a country within weeks of making its first batch of bombs. This announcement immediately raised the question, how much economic sense it made for Saudi Arabia to invest in nuclear power. It also raised a number of security questions. Should the United States allow Riyadh to reprocess and enrich even though these activities could bring Saudi Arabia within weeks of acquiring nuclear weapons? If Washington acceded to this demand by Riyadh, what would be the implications for the terms of nuclear cooperation with the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and Morocco? How would such an agreement impact efforts to tighten the terms of our nuclear understanding with Iran? Would such a permissive deal with Riyadh make it more difficult to say no to Seoul’s demand that we allow them to enrich uranium? All of these questions and more are discussed in this volume’s four sections.
Mar 01, 2017 A Fresh Examination of the Proliferation Dangers of Light Water Reactors (Working Paper 1701)
Dr. Gilinsky -- a Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner during the Ford, Carter and Reagan Administrations -- co-authored this report with Marvin Miller and Harmon Hubbard in October 2004. The report's larger argument was recently cited in Bret Stephen's column, "Giving Iran the Bomb" (Wall Street Journal, October 31, 2006). NPEC rereleased the report in March 2017 with an updated introduction.
Aug 26, 2016 Brian M. Jenkins and John Lauder: The Nuclear Terrorism Threat: How Real Is It? (Working Paper 1602)
NPEC Working Paper 1602, “The Nuclear Terrorism Threat: How Real Is It?” presents two opposed views on the threat of nuclear terrorism. Brian M. Jenkins, a Rand analyst and a leading expert on nuclear terrorism, argues that the threat is overblown. John Lauder,  former director of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Nonproliferation Center, argues the opposing case that the threat is growing and we need to be hedging against it now.
Aug 26, 2016 How Dark Might East Asia's Nuclear Future Be? (Working Paper 1601)
NPEC Working Paper 1601, “How Dark Might East Asia’s Nuclear Future Be?” contains detailed projections of what the future holds for a more nuclear-armed China, Japan, North Korea and South Korea. None are predictions. The volume’s purpose is to encourage deeper debate about the security implications of nuclear proliferation in East Asia.
Jan 06, 2016 Alternative North Korean Nuclear Futures
National Defense University's Shane Smith gives the big picture on North Korea's nuclear ambitions in a piece commissioned by the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.   
May 05, 2015 If Japan and South Korea Go Nuclear: Two Military-Technical Scenarios
Recently, NPEC commissioned a series of major studies to explore how technologically feasible and quick nuclear weapons proliferation in East Asia might be. The studies on Japan and South Korea are showcased below.    
Oct 16, 2014 The Security Threats Nuclear-Capable Missiles Pose and How to Best Control Them
A paper presented by Alexander Savelyev at NPEC's East Asian Nuclear Future's Conference held in Singapore October 15-16, 2014.
Sep 28, 2014 Greg Jones: Ensuring the Iran Negotiations Do Not Promote the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
NPEC Senior Researcher Greg Jones argues the P5+1 should toughen its stance and demand that Iran give up all centrifuge enrichment, dismantle the Arak reactor, give up its heavy water stocks, and dismantle its heavy water production facility.  He argues that allowing Iran to retain its nuclear capabilities can inflict enduring damage on broader U.S. nonproliferation efforts by legitimizing centrifuge enrichment or heavy water plutonium production reactors for other countries as well, making it easy for them to produce nuclear material for weapons whenever they desire them.
May 05, 2014 Greg Jones: Washington's "Comprehensive Solution" to Iran's Nuclear Program: Destined to be Neither
Negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program are continuing in an effort to produce a follow-on agreement, termed the “Comprehensive Solution,” to the November 2013 “Joint Plan of Action” (JPA).  Much of the discussion of the Comprehensive Solution has focused on the terms such an agreement should include to prevent Iran from being able to produce nuclear weapons.  However, this objective will not be attainable unless the agreement addresses key aspects of Iran’s nuclear program, fixes the flaws in the JPA which seriously constrain any agreement and recognizes fundamental problems with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as currently implemented.
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The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), is a 501 (c)3 nonpartisan, nonprofit, educational organization
founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues. NPEC educates policymakers, journalists,
and university professors about proliferation threats and possible new policies and measures to meet them.
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