QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED

I. What might the attributes of a Trumpian arms control agenda be?

II. What emerging threats might it focus on?

III. How could new forms of diplomacy strengthen America’s strategic responses to these threats?
“...[Nuclear] proliferation is ... the biggest problem in the world... If we can do something to .. ideally get rid of them, maybe that's a dream, but certainly it's a subject that I'll be bringing up with [Putin]” President Trump, News Conference, July 13, 2018
PUTIN’S STRATEGIC WEAPONS AGENDA WAS SPECIFIC BUT HARDLY TRUMPIAN

- Extending New START
- INF Treaty issues
- Non-placement of weapons in space
- Upholding the Iran nuclear deal
WHAT MIGHT A TRUMPIAN AGENDA ENTAIL

I. It would support US strategic military objectives.

II. It would be competitive: It would exploit economic and technological trends that advantage the United States.

III. It would not only inform follow on discussions with the Russians, but our diplomacy towards other nations as well.
THE OBJECTIVES FOR SOUND CONTROL INITIATIVES AND MILITARY SCIENCE ARE THE SAME:

1. Reduce the probability of war;

2. reduce the destructiveness of the wars that do occur; and

3. reduce military expenditures

THIS POINT IS NOW GETTING LOST

OR

Nuclear Deterrence

7/20/2018
CONNECTING OUR NUCLEAR POSTURE WITH ARMS CONTROL, IN FACT, IS REQUIRED BY LAW


Sec. 1671. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the nuclear posture review should…

(3) consider input and views from all relevant stakeholders in the United States Government… on issues pertaining to nuclear deterrence, nuclear nonproliferation, and nuclear arms control.
THE NPR OFFERS AN ARMS CONTROL MODEL

Indeed, U.S. pursuit of a SLCM may provide the necessary incentive for Russia to negotiate seriously a reduction of its non-strategic nuclear weapons, just as the prior Western deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe led to the 1987 INF Treaty. As then Secretary of State George P. Shultz stated, “If the West did not deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles, there would be no incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously for nuclear weapons reductions.”
MEDIUM-SIZED MINDS THINK ALIKE?

From: Henry Sokolski <henry@npolicy.org>
Date: Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 1:37 PM
Subject: 2 points for the upcoming nuclear posture and arms control review
To: 

— I got to believe you're under a mountain of emails and other communications. We can talk about these matters later but just to answer the mail (you just sent) literally, the two simple points worth considering that I discussed with are as follows:

1. Every policy worthy of its name has got to have a happy ending. We don't just compete to compete, we compete (as our president has emphasized) to win. Much of what's been written and that will and should guide the nuclear posture review is the need to be competitive in the realm of nuclear strategic activities and programs. That means modernizing existing forces. Fair enough. The ultimate question, however, is how might our efforts to catch up and compete in this realm end. In the Carter–Reagan years, we understood that the deployment of INF systems was slaved with talks to eliminate them. What we ended up with was an agreement not to deploy that helped discredit the Soviet military, which, in turn, helped bring down the Soviet union. It maybe too early to specify publicly what the happy endings might be to any military efforts we undertake now but it's not too early to start off line thinking about this as no expensive long-term military modernization effort is likely to be sustainable without it. One thing is certain: after every Republican administration there's a Democratic one and if we don't have a positive narrative about arms control, they will substitute theirs for ours. What I'd like to talk to you about is what those positive narratives might look like.
NATO MINISTERS DUAL TRACK DECISION

December 12, 1979
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Soviet RSD-10 Pioneer missile

US BGM-109G Gryphon

US Pershing II missile
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TREATY

December 8, 1987

[Image of two men signing documents]
The U.S. has 80 percent fewer nuclear weapons than it did in 1987. Since then, Pakistan and North Korea have become nuclear powers, and Iran has aggressively sought to develop nuclear weapons.
II. WHAT EMERGING THREATS MIGHT BENEFIT FROM THIS KIND OF APPROACH?
STRATEGIC THREAT 1: GROUND-BASED MISSILES

CHINA’S BALLISTIC MISSILES

China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world. Upgrading its missile forces in number, type, and capability, China is modernizing its ICBMs, developing multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles and maneuvering boost-glide vehicles, and has begun deploying a new fleet of nuclear ballistic missile submarines. Short- and medium-range cruise and ballistic missiles form a critical part of its regional anti-access and area denial efforts.

IRAN’S BALLISTIC MISSILES

Iran possesses the largest and most diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East, with thousands of short- and medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles capable of striking as far as Iraq and southeast Europe. Missiles have become a central tool of Iranian power projection and anti-access/area denial capabilities in the face of U.S. and Gulf Cooperation Council naval and air power in the region.

RUSSIA’S LAND-BASED MISSILES

Russia boasts the widest inventory of ballistic and cruise missiles in the world. Moscow’s strategic forces perform a variety of missions, from anti-access and area denial in local conflicts to the delivery of strategic nuclear weapons. Significant modernization efforts include new heavy ICBMs, as well as ground-launched cruise missiles in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

NORTH KOREA’S BALLISTIC MISSILES

North Korea’s ballistic missile program is one of the most rapidly developing threats to global security. In recent years, an unprecedented pace of missile testing has included new and longer range missiles, sea-launches, and the testing of satellites. The most notable of these advances has been North Korea’s development of two new intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Hwasong-14 and -15, which can likely reach the continental United States.
TODAY’S ACCURATE, CONVENTIONAL MISSILES ARE NEARLY AS LETHAL AS NUCLEAR MISSILES
ANOTHER MISSILE PROBLEM, RUSSIAN INF VIOLATIONS

Novator 9M729: A land-based cruise missile thought to have a range between 500km and 5,500km, violating the INF.
US MILITARY RESPONSE 1: BOOST PHASE MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS AND MORE
RESPONSE 2: NEW LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES FOR DAMAGE LIMITATION

Long Range Standoff weapon
RESPONSE 3: HYPersonics, INF MISSle RESEARCH

Boeing X-51 hypersonic cruise missile
BUT THESE MILITARY RESPONSES ALONE WON’T SUFFICE

- Current US missile defenses can be overwhelmed by numbers
- Effective boost-phase intercepts may entail violating international law
- Russia and China can make many more offensive missiles than the US can
- Russia and China are developing hypersonics too
THREAT 2: “PEACEFUL” STALKING SATS THAT COULD PRODUCE SPACE PEARL HARBORS

July 20, 2013, Chinese maneuvering satellite killer satellites

Russian Rokot launch, March 2015
TO COPE, US NEEDS STEALTHY, RESILIENT, REPLENISHABLE, MANEUVERING, AND OFFENSIVE SATELLITE SYSTEMS

US Airforce autonomous space shuttle X-37

US Airforce maneuvering satellite

SPACEX launch and reentry

DARPA BLACKJACK Program

Misty US Stealthy Satellite Program
BUT EVEN WITH THESE PROGRAMS, US IS STILL IN A BIND

• Without a clear right to preventative self defense, none of these systems can prevent our major satellites from being knocked out.
THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S NATIONAL SPACE STRATEGY RECOGNIZES THIS

“We will strengthen U.S. and allied options to deter potential adversaries from extending conflict into space and, **if deterrence fails, to counter threats used by adversaries for hostile purposes.**”

*America First National Space Strategy*, Fact Sheet, March 23, 2018
MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL EFFORTS THAT WOULD HELP

Reorganize current US military programs and give them geographically focused narratives

- Prompt Missile Initiative (In re China and Russia)
- A North Korea/Iran focused boost-phase defense program
- Space Pearl Harbor Prevention Program (In re China and Russia)
III. WHAT NEW DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES COULD HELP REDUCE THESE THREATS?
AS WE MODERNIZE OUR SPACE SYSTEMS, PUSH SPACE RULES OF THE ROAD & AGREEMENTS TO PREVENT SPACE PEARL HARBORS

• Negotiate with Russia and China and other satellite faring states to allow each state only to transit near another state’s key satellite assets for so long with so many satellites.

• Agree that if these limits are violated, the violated party could exercise their right to self defense

• Pair clarification of these rules with more traditional limits on ground-based ASATs

Strategic Studies Quarterly
Brian G. Chow

“Stalkers In Space: Defeating the Threat”
Summer 2017

“Space Arms Control: A Hybrid Approach”
Summer 2018
Work with Russia on an agreement to prohibit INF missiles in the European theater but allow them elsewhere e.g., in Asia.
PAIR GENERAL MISSILE RACE WITH INITIATIVE ON GROUND-BASED MISSILES

- Begin multilateral talks, starting with Russia and China, to ban all “nuclear missiles” – i.e., ground based nuclear-capable missiles beyond Missile Technology Control Regime Category I limits.

GLOBALIZING REAGAN’S INF TREATY: Easier Done Than Said?
By David A. Cooper

The Security Threats Nuclear-Capable Missiles Pose and How to Best Control Them
By Alexander G. Savelyev
Head of the Department of Strategic Studies, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences
PAIR BOOST PHASE INTERCEPT WITH NPT-BASED MISSILE LAUNCH LIMITS

• Propose a UN resolution that nations that violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty may not launch nuclear capable missiles outside of their air space and if they attempt to do so, these missiles may be neutralized within their airspace

National Review

What to Do about Pyongyang

Nuclear nonproliferation is on the ropes. Does the U.S. have the will to act?

By Henry Sokolski
April 2, 2009
WE’VE DONE THIS BEFORE
THREAT 3: IRAN AND NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMS AND THE THREAT OF FURTHER PROLIFERATION

• Further North Korean nuclear ramp up and possible use.

• Iran: Nuclear breakout
THE US RESPONSE

• Diplomatically and economically squeeze Iran with sanctions and military competitions.

• Economically squeeze North Korea while engaging in diplomatic talks.

• Demonstrate a willingness extend nuclear deterrence to South Korea and our friends in the Gulf.
WHY THIS ISN’T ENOUGH

• It is unclear what Iran’s neighbors will do while the United States “squeezes” Iran; Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and the UAE may get a nuclear option of their own.

• While talks with North Korea are ongoing, South Korea might ramp up their nuclear potential, which will likely cause Japan and China to break out or ramp up as well.
PROMOTE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO REDUCE WEAPONS-USABLE FISSIONABLE MATERIAL

• Push the Gold Standard not just on the UAE on Iran, Saudi Arabia, and others seeking to renew a nuclear cooperative agreement with the US (Egypt and Turkey).

• Promote a civil plutonium production pause starting with Japan and including South Korea, China, and North Korea.
MISSILE CONTROLS IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

- Work with France, EU, Russia, and China, to offer Iran and other Middle Eastern states space launch services in exchange for a ban on launches of SLVs in region; ban the export of any Missile Technology Control (MTCR) Category I missile systems or components into the region.

How to Stop Iran's Missile Program
By William Tobey and Henry Sokolski
December 10, 2017

America must unite, not divide, other major powers to constrain Iran.
LIMIT HYPERSONICS PROLIFERATION

- Begin negotiations to limit the further spread of hypersonic technologies among the major developers of such technology – US, Russia, and China. Tighten MTCR controls on the technology.

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html