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HOME > TOPICS > The Nonproliferation Regime      
The Nonproliferation Regime

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) represents three basic bargains. The first is encapsulated in Articles One and Two of the treaty. They prohibit states with nuclear weapons from transferring them or the means to make them to states that lack nuclear weapons, and ban nonweapons states from acquiring them. The second NPT bargain is set forth in Articles Three, Four, and Six. These articles stipulate that the nuclear weapons states will negotiate in good faith to disarm and will share the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy with nonweapons states. In exchange, the nonweapons states pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons and to allow international inspections of their civilian nuclear facilities and materials to verify whether non-nuclear weapons states are in compliance with the treaty and are not diverting peaceful nuclear activities or materials to make nuclear weapons.

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Aug 25, 2019 What Enforcement of the NPT Now Requires
Earlier this month, it was reported that the White House wants a new deal with Iran that would eliminate uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of spent reactor fuel. Whatever Iran's answer to such a request might be, this principle needs near universal application if nuclear power is to remain compatible with international security. The reason why is simple: When it comes to enrichment and reprocessing, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) cannot reliably confirm military diversions in a timely fashion. If we are serious about enforcement -- the touchstone for any effective nuclear agreement -- we have to start saying "no" to civilian nuclear cooperation with non-weapon states that are unwilling to forswear enrichment and reprocessing. This piece, "Nuclear Power Must Not Lead to Nuclear Bombs," by NPEC Executive Director, Henry Sokolski, and NPEC's Program Advisor, Victor Gilinsky was published in The National Interest.
Op-Eds & Blogs
Jun 25, 2019 June 25 Dinner - If Pyongyang Attacks S. Korea's Nuclear Plants, Are We Ready?
On June 25, 2019, NPEC hosted a dinner seminar on nuclear reactor vulnerabilities. The seminars featured presentations by Jungmin Kang, Former Chairman under President Moon of the South Korean Nuclear Safety and Security Commission and William Tobey, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation of the National Nuclear Security Administration.
Presentations; Audio & Video
Apr 24, 2019 USD Guest Lecture: What's Shaping Global Nuclear Weapons Competitions: It Isn't Nuclear Arms
In April 2019, NPEC's Executive Director gave a guest lecture at the University of San Diego on global strategic competition.
Presentations; Audio & Video
Mar 25, 2019 America's Nuclear Export Controls are Fundamentally Flawed
A piece by NPEC's Executive Director, Henry Sokolski, and NPEC's Program Advisor, Victor Gilinsky, on America's nuclear exports in The National Interest called "America's Nuclear Export Controls are Fundamentally Flawed."
Op-Eds & Blogs
Sep 20, 2018 Nuclear Power's Weapons Link: Cause to Limit, Not Boost Exports
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists publishes a new piece from NPEC's Executive Director, Henry Sokolski, and Program Advisor, Victor Gilinsky, on the use of nuclear power, "Nuclear Power's Weapons Link: Cause to Limit, Not Boost Exports"
Op-Eds & Blogs
Jun 28, 2018 Make US-Japanese Nuclear Cooperation Stable Again: End Reprocessing
NPEC's Executive Director and Program Advisor publish a new op-ed in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, "Make US-Japanese Nuclear Cooperation Stable Again: End Reprocessing."
Op-Eds & Blogs
Jun 21, 2018 Intelligence and Policy Community Cooperation in the Libya WMD Disarmament Case (Occasional Paper 1802)
As the Trump Administration prepares to negotiate with North Korea, a question has arisen as to what model Washington should follow. National Security Advisor John Bolton has suggested that the Libyan nuclear case represents the best example to emulate. Given the violence Libya suffered after it disarmed, this recommendation provoked criticism, not only from the North Korean government, but a number of American analysts.    Anticipating the importance of this case, NPEC commissioned William Tobey, former Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration, to write a primary history. Mr. Tobey served on the National Security Council in the Bush (43) Administration when the Libyan nuclear case was being worked.    For his primary history, Tobey conducted extensive history. Shortly after it was completed, the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence presented him with the prestigious Studies in Intelligence Award for 2018. 
Working Papers & Monographs
May 24, 2018 John Batchelor Show Interviews on Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Bomb
John Batchelor interviews NPEC's Executive Director on the possibility of renegotiating the Iran Deal, the proposed US civilian nuclear cooperative agreementwith Saudi Arabia, and the important distinction between safeguarding and monitoring. 
Interviews; Audio & Video
May 24, 2018 Letter to Congress on Nuclear Cooperation with Saudi Arabia
On May 24, 2018, 14 nuclear security experts, including NPEC's Executive Director, sent a letter to the chairs and ranking members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The letter called on Congress "to make sure that with any cooperative agreement with Saudi Arabia, our government does what is necessary to ensure that Saudi Arabia does not reprocess spent fuel or enrich uranium, whether it buys reactors or reactor components from U.S.-based firms or not." The letter was featured in a Washington Post piece, "Pompeo: Saudis must not enrich uranium if it seeks civilian nuclear cooperation."
Official Docs & Letters
May 22, 2018 How Bad Might the Middle East's Nuclear Future Get?
NPEC's Executive Director introduces his new op-ed in Foreign Policy, "In the Middle East, Soon Everyone Will Want the Bomb."
Op-Eds & Blogs
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The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), is a 501 (c)3 nonpartisan, nonprofit, educational organization
founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues. NPEC educates policymakers, journalists,
and university professors about proliferation threats and possible new policies and measures to meet them.
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