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The Nonproliferation Regime
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The Nonproliferation Regime |
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The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) represents three basic bargains. The first is encapsulated in Articles One and Two of the treaty. They prohibit states with nuclear weapons from transferring them or the means to make them to states that lack nuclear weapons, and ban nonweapons states from acquiring them. The second NPT bargain is set forth in Articles Three, Four, and Six. These articles stipulate that the nuclear weapons states will negotiate in good faith to disarm and will share the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy with nonweapons states. In exchange, the nonweapons states pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons and to allow international inspections of their civilian nuclear facilities and materials to verify whether non-nuclear weapons states are in compliance with the treaty and are not diverting peaceful nuclear activities or materials to make nuclear weapons.
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Jan 30, 2014 |
NPEC's Executive Director Gives Senate Testimony on Tightening Nonproliferation Rules
Prepared testimony of NPEC's executive director to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 30, 2014, "Section 123: Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreements". For a full list of witnesses and video of the hearing, click here.
Testimony & Transcripts
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Nov 14, 2013 |
Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future
NPEC's executive director presented a lecture at the Institute of World Politics in Washington, DC.
Presentations; Audio & Video
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Jun 21, 2013 |
The Weekly Standard Posts NPEC Analysis, "Hucksterism vs. Nonproliferation: Irreconcilable US Nuclear Policies"
In The Weekly Standard, NPEC's Executive Director Henry Sokolski and Program Advisor Victor Gilinsky argue that the Obama's administration's country-to-country approach allows prospective nuclear sales to trump proliferation concerns.
Articles
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May 14, 2013 |
Victor Gilinsky: Sometimes Major Violations of Nuclear Security Get Ignored
The traditional justification for accepting nuclear power activities around the world, despite their obvious technological overlap with military ones, is that they are covered by agreements restricting them to “peaceful uses,” and that any violations of these agreements would be detected in time by international inspectors or by national intelligence. The trouble is, even when solid information on violations is available early enough, the main countries on whose action international enforcement depends are sometimes reluctant to take needed action.
Working Papers & Monographs
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May 06, 2013 |
Greg Jones: America's 1962 Reactor-Grade Plutonium Weapons Test Revisited
In 1977, the U.S. declassified the fact that in 1962 it had successfully tested a nuclear weapon using reactor-grade plutonium. In 1994 additional information about this test was released. Though on the face of it this test would seem to definitively settle the issue about whether reactor-grade plutonium can be used in nuclear weapons, ironically the specifics related to this nuclear test have generated some of the most controversy.
Working Papers & Monographs
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Mar 19, 2013 |
Henry Sokolski Book Review: Atoms for Peace: Catalyzing Bombs for Cheats
NPEC's executive director reviews Atomic Assistance: How "Atoms for Peace" Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity, by Matthew Fuhrmann, in the March 2013 edition of The Nonproliferation Review.
Articles
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Feb 12, 2013 |
National Review Online Posts NPEC Analysis, "After North Korea's Test: Slow the Nuclear Dominos"
Rather than support Tokyo’s and Seoul’s cravings to develop nuclear-weapons options, NPEC's executive director argues that the U.S. should explicitly waive the need for Japan and South Korea to secure any licenses to export their nuclear reactors if these two countries agree to a set of additional nonproliferation conditions, and put off recycling any U.S.-origin spent reactor fuel. Additionally, the U.S. should publicly call on China to join the U.S. and Russia in any further nuclear-weapons-reduction effort.
Op-Eds & Blogs
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Dec 17, 2012 |
Serious Rules for Nuclear Power without Proliferation (video)
Presentation at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies.
Audio & Video
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Sep 20, 2012 |
Gold Standard Letter to the President
NPEC signed a letter with other notables to President Obama expressing concern that the U.S. will not pursue the "Gold Standard" in negotiations for civil nuclear cooperation agreements with Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Jordan, Vietnam, and other non-nuclear-weapon states. The letter urges President Obama to require the "Gold Standard" in all future nuclear cooperation agreements with states that lack nuclear weapons.
Official Docs & Letters
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Aug 02, 2012 |
Susan Voss: Tracking Nuclear Proliferation within a Commercial Power Program
As speculation rises about if and when Israel might strike Iran's nuclear program, it's worth considering how Iran got to where it is now with its program. Iran started in earnest with its nuclear efforts by initiating a nuclear power reactor construction program at Bushehr. Such "peaceful" projects are "bomb starter kits" in a number of ways. First, the reactors themselves can be used to make significant quantities of nuclear weapons-usable plutonium. Second, and easily as important in Iran's case, they can be used as covers to acquire the training, equipment, material, and technologies needed to do far more than boil water.
This latter point is one that President Bill Clinton and Ambassador John Bolton both emphasized. Specifically, though, what does it mean? Attached is an NPEC working paper by Susan Voss, "Tracking Nuclear Proliferation within a Commercial Power Program," which tells the tale in critical detail. Ms. Voss, who was an analyst at Los Alamos National Laboratory, and is currently the President of the Global Nuclear Network Analysis, LLC, is one of the nation's top experts on Iran's civilian nuclear program and how Iran used it to acquire all that it needed to edge ever closer to acquiring nuclear weapons. It's quite revealing how brazen Iran was in using its program to secure Russian nuclear fuel and nuclear weapons-related technology and training in relative plain sight. By revealing and analyzing these transactions, Ms. Voss also spotlights what the intelligence requirements must be for any serious nonproliferation effort. This is an area we still need to work on.
Working Papers & Monographs
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