On Saturday, President Trump warned that if Iran should choose to build new nuclear fuel making plants, he would “obliterate” them. This announcement followed a private meeting earlier this month between Vice President J.D. Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Netanyahu’s trusted advisor, Ron Dermer, to clarify when the United States might greenlight Israel to bomb Iranian nuclear sites again.
The President’s warning raises the question of how, after the Iran bombings, the United States should police nonproliferation. Last Friday, I gave a presentation before the National Institute for Deterrence Studies to examine what our government’s policy for using military force against nuclear nonproliferation violators should be.
The presentation, “After Iran: What Will Policing Nonproliferation Require?,” is broken into five parts. The first examines the similarities of the late 70s and early 80s to what we’re now going through—a mixture of hostile and friendly states on the brink of getting bombs.
The second section, “No Rules, No Policing, Not Right,” reviews the most recent official statements on when the United States might use force again against Iran. The third reviews other possible nonproliferation rules and red lines the United States and other nations could adopt.
The presentation’s last section focuses on creating a Nonproliferation Enforcement Initiative that would have its own command at STRATCOM. Finally, there’s a Q&A section.
As always, I’m curious to get your take.
Henry S.
July 18, 2025
After Iran: What Will Policing Nonproliferation Require? (NIDS Presentation)
Part I. Introduction & Historical Context (00:00)
Part II. No Rules, No Policing, Not Right (06:26)
Part III. What Other Rules of Guidelines, if Any, Should We Adopt? (15:45)
Part IV. The Case For Nonproliferation Enforcement Initiative (NEI) (35:38)
Part V. Discussion (43:11)
To watch the full presentation, click here.

