Just before New Year’s, Thomas Grant and I wrote a piece, “Maybe Arms Control Does Have a Future,” for The Wall Street Journal. The op-ed explains how the United States should exploit the April Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference to get Moscow and Beijing to negotiate meaningful nuclear weapons limits.
Arms control critics have long argued that nuclear diplomacy is yesterday’s folly; that it has no future. Tom and I disagree. The United States and its security treaty allies still have leverage over Moscow and Beijing. In specific, both China and Russia fear possible U.S. nuclear weapons deployments to NATO, Japan, and South Korea.
As Tom and I note, the United States is hardly eager to make such deployments. However, Beijing’s massive nuclear weapons ramp-up and its refusal to negotiate nuclear controls as required by the NPT, and Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling are stoking allied interest in basing U.S. nuclear weapons on their soil. Senior officials in Poland, Japan, and South Korea have all expressed interest in such deployments. Beijing and Moscow have consistently railed against them.
Russia insists its forward deployment of nuclear arms to Belarus is legal under the NPT, but American deployments to NATO are not. China opposes all forward deployments, including Russia’s, as violations of the NPT, while Washington believes its deployments to NATO are legal under the treaty.
Articles I and II of the NPT prohibit non-nuclear-weapons states from being given “control” over nuclear-weapons states’ nuclear arms. What control means, though, is in dispute.
To focus attention on this, Tom and I recommend that the Pentagon adopt Bruce Bennett’s 2023 three-step RAND proposal. The first step would be to build or refurbish U.S. nuclear weapons storage sites in NATO states, Japan, and South Korea. The second would be to increase nuclear-related exercises with these states.
The third would be to create a nuclear weapons escrow account that would allow allied states to pay to refurbish 100 or more U.S. theater nuclear weapons otherwise slated for dismantlement. The U.S. would store these weapons on American soil for safekeeping, but would redeploy them to the states that funded their refurbishment in times of crisis.
These steps, especially the nuclear escrow account idea, would likely prompt protests from Beijing and Moscow and set the stage for clarifying just what NPT “control” should mean. If Russia and China object to how Washington reads the NPT, what might they be willing to do to reach a compromise reading.
Might Russia withdraw its thousands of theater nuclear weapons to the east of the Ural Mountains and allow strict verification of such withdrawals in exchange for America withdrawing its 100 weapons from NATO soil? Might China freeze its plutonium production at its “peaceful” spent-fuel reprocessing plants in exchange for an American pledge not to forward deploy U.S. nuclear warheads to its Asian allies?
Tom and I suggest our diplomats find out at the upcoming NPT Review Conference. We believe it’s arms control that might have a future.
As always, I’m curious to get your take.
As Ever,
Henry S.
December 29, 2025
By: Thomas Grant & Henry Sokolski
Maybe Arms Control Does Have a Future
As China makes a global spectacle of its nuclear buildup and Russia threatens to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, President Trump says he will resume testing nuclear weapons. No wonder everyone thinks arms control is dead. The U.S. withdrew from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019 and since then has dropped two other arms-control agreements, the Open Skies Agreement and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Meanwhile New Start, which caps Russian and U.S. weapons deployments, expires in February.
One possible bright spot ahead is the April Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference at the United Nations in New York. The U.S. can take advantage in those talks of its right to deploy nuclear weapons to get China and Russia to pull back on their nuclear-weapons misbehavior.
China, Russia, and the U.S. disagree about Articles I and II of the NPT, which prohibit letting nonweapons states gain “control” of nuclear weapons. Russia insists its recent redeployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus doesn’t violate the NPT, but that America’s efforts to upgrade its forward nuclear-weapons deployments in Europe do. China argues both Russian and U.S. stationing of nuclear weapons on foreign soil are illegal under the NPT. The U.S. believes its own and Russia’s forward deployments are legal.
Washington could cut this knot in three steps. First, continue to upgrade nuclear weapons storage sites in Britain, Europe, South Korea and Japan. Second, increase its joint nuclear exercises with all interested allies. Third, invite Germany, Poland, Balkan allies, Finland, Sweden, Turkey, South Korea, Japan and Australia to implement a RAND proposal to fund the refurbishment of at least 100 nuclear warheads the Pentagon is planning to dismantle. The U.S. would keep the weapons in an escrow account on U.S. soil to deploy in a crisis if asked.
These steps—especially the last—would prompt immediate Russian and Chinese protests. Washington could then invite Chinese and Russian diplomats to field their concerns at arms-control negotiations. It’s easy to anticipate what each would say. China would insist that Washington do nothing to redeploy nuclear weapons to South Korea or Japan. Russia would be no less adamant that the U.S. forgo nuclear weapons redeployments to any member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
U.S. negotiators could then ask: What are China and Russia willing to offer in exchange?
Russian nuclear provocations and Chinese nuclear buildup have rattled U.S. allies. That’s why they have requested that the U.S. back its security guarantees with a threat to use nuclear weapons if necessary. It’s also why some allied officials have suggested deploying nuclear weapons on their soil. The U.S. would prefer not to, but it will be difficult to say no unless China and Russia reduce the nuclear activities that are giving rise to these demands.
Might Russia consider withdrawing its in-theater nuclear weapons to the east of the Urals in exchange for a U.S. withdrawal of its approximately 100 weapons from NATO countries? Would China freeze production of separated plutonium by shutting down its spent-fuel recycling plants? Would China and Russia finally allow three-way nuclear arms reduction talks (something China has rejected repeatedly)?
The Pentagon and State Department should find out at the NPT Review Conference. Beforehand, the U.S. should call for a clarification of the meaning of “control” and “nuclear sharing” under Articles I and II of the NPT. This would prompt China and Russia to repeat their arguments, which are at odds with each other and with the U.S. position. Then American diplomats could clarify what the NPT means by “control” in a way beneficial to all three parties. This would lead to a discussion of nuclear limitations on each party in exchange for pledging no redeployments on foreign soil.
Many observers think the NPT Review Conference is a ceremonial event. Neither the White House nor the State Department has said what the U.S. position will be at the conference—an omission worth correcting.
The first Trump administration argued correctly that China should live up to its Article VI obligation to negotiate nuclear arms control in good faith. It should stick to its guns in the coming conference and add the concerns about nuclear sharing and control.
To read the full piece, click here.