When experts discuss the prospects of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), they naturally focus on impending events. Will nonaligned nations tie their continued adherence to reaching a comprehensive test ban? Will North Korea, Algeria, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Japan, and Iran live up to their NPT obligations? Will some follow through on their threats to withdraw from the treaty? Is China, which is building more nuclear weapons and refused to agree to limit them, in violation of the treaty’s demand that nuclear weapons states limit their nuclear arms? Will the NPT’s inspectorate, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), strengthen its inspection procedures? Can certain nuclear materials and activities ever be reliably inspected to detect and prevent their military diversion? The answers to these questions will determine not only the future of the NPT but the prospects for nuclear restraint.
Paper Presented at NPEC/King’s College conference “After Iran: Safeguarding Peaceful Nuclear Energy” held in London, UK October 2-3, 2005. Oct 01, 2005 AUTHOR: Thomas B. Cochran Adequacy of IAEAs Safeguards for Achieving Timely Detection-PAPER (PDF) 227.80 KB DRAFT 2 DRAFT 2 DRAFT 2 Adequacy of […]
Paper Presented at NPEC/King’s College conference “After Iran: Safeguarding Peaceful Nuclear Energy” held in London, UK October 2-3, 2005. Oct 01, 2005 AUTHOR: Edwin S. Lyman Can Nuclear Fuel Production in Iran and Elsewhere Be Safeguarded Again…. (PDF) 96.24 KB Can Nuclear Fuel Production in […]
The best chance for nations seeking to prevent further nuclear proliferation is to enforce the original presumption of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Article IV, says author Henry Sokolski. Article IV presumes “against the unnecessary spread of unsafeguardable nuclear activities and materials.” In the case of […]
Paper presented for the Conference “Germany and Nuclear Nonproliferation”, organized by the Aspen Institute, Berlin and the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Washington, D.C, by Joachim Krause, director, Institute for Security Studies at the University of Kiel. Feb 26, 2005 AUTHOR: Joachim Krause German Nuclear Export […]
As featured in The Economist, the final updated version of this NPEC report examines the International Atomic Energy Agency´s ability to safeguard peaceful nuclear energy, and provides a series of recommendations to shore up the NPT-IAEA safeguards system´s shortfalls. For commissioned research associated with this […]
An interim report of NPEC´s working group on Iran. Mar 11, 2004 Preliminary Policy Recommendations-An interim report of NPECs working …. (PDF) 50.53 KB Preliminary Policy Recommendations Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Competitive Strategies Work Shop Series on Iran 1. Have a U.S. or allied executive […]
This article on the U.S. policy towards bio-chemical threats for Orbis is also available on their website. Apr 01, 2001 AUTHOR: Henry Sokolski Rethinking Bio-Chemical Dangers (PDF) 67.68 KB Rethinking Bio-Chemical Dangers Last year President Clinton announced the U.S. would spend $10 billion on countering […]
Presented at the Strategic Weapons Proliferation Teaching Seminar. Sponsored by The Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation & The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Aug 23, 1998 AUTHOR: Thomas B. Cochran Cochran_Tech Issues Related to Prolif (PDF) 292.75 KB Technological Issues Related to the Proliferation of […]
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