An interim report of NPEC´s working group on Iran. Mar 11, 2004 Preliminary Policy Recommendations-An interim report of NPECs working …. (PDF) 50.53 KB Preliminary Policy Recommendations Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Competitive Strategies Work Shop Series on Iran 1. Have a U.S. or allied executive […]
When experts discuss the prospects of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), they naturally focus on impending events. Will nonaligned nations tie their continued adherence to reaching a comprehensive test ban? Will North Korea, Algeria, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Japan, and Iran live up to their NPT obligations? Will some follow through on their threats to withdraw from the treaty? Is China, which is building more nuclear weapons and refused to agree to limit them, in violation of the treaty’s demand that nuclear weapons states limit their nuclear arms? Will the NPT’s inspectorate, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), strengthen its inspection procedures? Can certain nuclear materials and activities ever be reliably inspected to detect and prevent their military diversion? The answers to these questions will determine not only the future of the NPT but the prospects for nuclear restraint.