NPEC Releases Group Letter to Trump on Iran’s Plutonium Option to Make 200+ Bombs

This weekend, the United States and Iran will resume technical nuclear talks in Pakistan. At the top of the agenda will be how to eliminate the possibility of Iran making ten or more nuclear weapons from its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium. Missing from the program, however, will be any discussion of how to keep Tehran from making more than 200 bombs from its growing stockpile of plutonium.

Earlier last month, I and three others—Scott Kemp, a Professor of Nuclear Engineering, MIT; Stephen Rademaker, the former Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation; and Peter Bradford, a former member of The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission—sent a letter to the President, the Secretaries of State and Energy, and the Deputy National Advisor urging them to focus on this danger.

The text of that letter can be found below. As always, I’m curious to get your take regarding the attached.

Iran’s Plutonium Bomb Option: Something to Talk About

June 12, 2025

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Dear Mr. President,

We support your goal of preventing Iran from making nuclear weapons. To do this, Iran can’t have facilities to enrich uranium or produce and retain stockpiles of it. Similarly, it must not have access to the 200-plus bombs worth of plutonium contained in the spent fuel at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant or the plutonium that might be generated at other planned Iranian reactors.

Russia offered to remove Bushehr’s spent fuel to a site outside Iran once the fuel had cooled down. Iran should be compelled to take Russia up on this offer or otherwise export the spent fuel. This also should be required of any other reactors Iran plans to build. The United States or Iran’s neighbors might help defray the associated costs.

In addition, the United States must insist that if Bushehr or other planned Iranian reactors operate at all, they be subject to near real-time International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) surveillance. At least 30 countries already voluntarily allow such surveillance. Even Iran allowed it for the Natanz Enrichment Facility.

Our concern is that Iran could easily divert the spent fuel for small batch reprocessing and extract several bomb’s worth of plutonium in less than any practical IAEA in-person inspection interval. Near real-time surveillance would help deter this.

Unfortunately, the United States has yet to demand near real-time surveillance at Iran’s reactor sites. The 2015 deal lacked it. The IAEA tried to secure such surveillance shortly after the 2015 nuclear deal was struck, but Iran refused. This time, we should insist upon it.

Again, we support your goal to keep Iran nuclear weapons-free and stand ready to assist in anyway we can.

Most respectfully,

Henry Sokolski, former Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy, Department of Defense

Scott Kemp, Professor of Nuclear Engineering, MIT

Stephen Rademaker, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation

Peter Bradford, former member of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

CC: Secretary of State Marco Rubio
Secretary of Energy Chris Wright
Deputy National Security Advisor Michael Needham