What might the next arms race look like? Assuming current nuclear trends continue, the next two decades will test America’s security and that of its closest allies as they never have been tested before. Well before 2030, the United Kingdom could find its nuclear forces eclipsed not only by those of Pakistan, but of Israel, North Korea, and India. France may share the same fate. Meanwhile, China could conceivably achieve nuclear parity in deployed nuclear weapons with the United States. Finally, highly accurate conventional missiles and drones, as well as the space-based systems and services needed to guide and defend against them are spreading both to rogue states and proxy forces. As a result, the next arms race, will be quite different than what we experienced during the Cold War.
A commentary by Matthew Bunn shared at NPEC’s meeting, “Securing Nuclear Arsenals for the Next Half Century: What Does History Recommend?” Feb 28, 2012 AUTHOR: Matthew Bunn Beyond Crises-The Unending Challenge of Controlling Nuclear Weapons an…. (PDF) 111.98 KB Beyond Crises: The Unending Challenge of...
A paper by Nikolai Sokov discussed at NPEC’s meeting, “Securing Nuclear Arsenals for the Next Half Century: What Does History Recommend?” Feb 28, 2012 AUTHOR: Nikolai Sokov Controlling Soviet-Russian Nuclear Weapons in Time of Instability (PDF) 441.81 KB Controlling Soviet/Russian Nuclear Weapons in Time of...
Bruno Tertrais examines the history surrounding France’s April 1961 Nuclear Test and aims to draw lessons for possible future contingencies where a nuclear-capable country is threatened from inside and the control of nuclear materials or weapons may be at risk. Feb 27, 2012 AUTHOR: Bruno...
Brigadier General Feroz Khan’s presentation at the Naval Postgraduate School on Pakistan: Political Transitions and Nuclear Management Feb 27, 2012 AUTHOR: Feroz Khan Pakistan-Political Transitions and Nuclear Management (PDF) 106.11 KB Pakistan: Political Transitions and Nuclear Management By Feroz Hassan Khan[1] Throughout its history, Pakistan...
Senior Researcher Greg Jones argues that the IAEA’s safeguards update shows that Western efforts to impede Iran’s centrifuge enrichment program continue to be ineffective. Iran has maintained a steady production of 3.5% and 19.7% enriched uranium. The IAEA has also outlined the substantial progress Iran...
Victor Gilinsky, former commissioner of the NRC prepared this for a conference in London co-hosted by NPEC and the Legatum Institute. Nov 09, 2011 AUTHOR: Victor Gilinsky Nuclear Power and Weapons – A New Look at an Old Issue (PDF) 21.79 KB NUCLEAR POWER AND...
NPEC Senior Analyst Greg Jones and IISS’s Mark Fitzpatrick debate the amount of time it would take for Iran to produce a bomb’s worth of HEU. Nov 07, 2011 AUTHOR: Greg Jones and Mark Fitzpatrick IISS-NPEC Exchange (PDF) 90.33 KB Gregory S. Jones[1] November 4,...
NPEC Senior Analyst Greg Jones responds to a second criticism from ISIS on the amount of time Iran requires to enrich a bomb’s worth of HEU. Nov 04, 2011 AUTHOR: Greg Jones Going Nowhere Fast – Greg Jones (PDF) 27.55 KB Gregory S. Jones[1] November...
This is a post-Arab Spring update on the prospects for nuclear proliferation in North Africa. Oct 19, 2011 AUTHOR: Bruno Tertrais AFTER IRAN_ PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN NORTH AFRICA – Tert…. (PDF) 198.77 KB [AFTER IRAN: PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN NORTH AFRICA[1] Paper...
The following is a rejoinder to a critique put out by ISIS about the validity of Greg Jones’ calculations from his August 2011 study. Oct 18, 2011 AUTHOR: Greg S. Jones Iran ISIS Response – Jones (PDF) 208.32 KB Gregory S. Jones[1] October 19, 2011...
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