Last week, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists asked me what nuclear policy questions the media and the public should ask America’s presidential candidates. I came up with three (attached below) that neither party yet has any talking points on. I’m skeptical anyone will ask them these questions. But they should.
First, what should the United States and its allies do once Iran gets the bomb? Currently, the debate is how much to squeeze or please the Mullahs to stay nonnuclear. But what’s America’s plan if none of that works? Should it help the Saudis develop a bomb option? Should it help them enrich uranium on their soil? What of our allies —e.g., South Korea, Japan, and Poland — that are sure to react poorly to news Iran has the bomb? Should it deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on their soil to dissuade them from going nuclear or take some other course?
Second, should Washington and its allies suspend civilian nuclear cooperation with China? The Pentagon has repeatedly warned that China is likely using its civilian fast reactors, spent fuel reprocessing plants, and heavy water reactors to enlarge its stockpile of nuclear weapons plutonium and tritium. Canada is helping China run its heavy water reactors, which are operated by CNNC, China’s nuclear weapons vendor. Cameo, a Canadian mining firm that owns half of Westinghouse recently sold a CNNC subsidiary one of the largest allotments of uranium on record. This week, Reuters reported that the U.S. Energy Department fears China is reselling Russian enriched uranium to U.S. utilities to end the ban on them importing Russian nuclear fuel.
Despite all this grim news, the Biden Administration still plans to export four Westinghouse power reactors to China. Might Beijing exploit these reactors for military purposes? In 2015, several Senate Foreign Relations Committee members complained that China violated its U.S. civilian nuclear cooperative agreement by diverting Westinghouse power reactor technology to quiet China’s nuclear submarines. This was only revealed well after the diversion occurred. Is America confident it could detect future military diversions from US plants in China? This raises the question: The Bush administration suspended U.S. nuclear cooperation with Russia after Putin invaded Georgia in 2008. Should the next administration do the same with China until the United States can confidently verify the peaceful use of its nuclear exports there?
Finally, if Washington is intent on expanding nuclear power, how will it defend new and existing plants against possible military assaults? The U.S. Energy Department is on record supporting a three-fold global expansion of nuclear power by 2050 and the export of massive numbers of U.S. reactors. The Pentagon also wants to build small reactors on U.S. bases here and abroad. Russia, however, has set the precedent of assaulting nuclear plants militarily. Meanwhile, China is developing intercontinental conventional missiles that experts fear might target our infrastructure. How should America prevent or defend against such assaults? Should it build reactors in war prone zones at all? Currently, the answers to these questions are shrouded in secrecy. Shouldn’t they be clarified in public?
As always, I am curious to get your take on the attached.
September 19, 2024
Authors: Henry Sokolski
Question for the candidates: What will you do if Iran gets the bomb?
Query US presidential candidates Kamala Harris or Donald Trump on the nuclear issues dominating the news and you are unlikely to get much more than party-prepared talking points. Gleaning more from the candidates requires cross-examining them on what has yet to capture the attention of the media.
Iran
Background: The current debate—how much should we please or squeeze Iran to keep it from acquiring nuclear bombs—ignores that such weapons are only a screwdriver’s turn away. What then? Should Washington eliminate Iran’s arsenal militarily or merely fortify Iran’s neighbors’ defenses? Push for regime change or negotiate to eliminate or limit Tehran’s weapons? Alternatively, should it deny as long as it can that Iran has weapons (that is, what it did with Israel and North Korea)?
Does it still make sense for the United States to help Saudi Arabia enrich uranium on their soil, a step that could bring the Kingdom to the brink of bomb-making? Both Biden and Trump officials have toyed with this. Separately, what, if anything, should Washington do to reduce the demand for nuclear weapons among Iran’s neighbors, including Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey? Should Washington bother?
Meanwhile, the nuclear aspirations of Japan, South Korea, and Poland are also sure to spike if Iran gets the bomb. Should Washington discourage them from going nuclear? If so, how? In the 1950s, the United States decided to help the United Kingdom with its nuclear weapons efforts. Should Washington do the same with other security allies? Some have suggested it should deploy US nuclear weapons on these countries’ soil. What, if anything, should Washington do if Russia and China do the same with their allies?
Question for the candidates:
- What is Washington prepared to do after Tehran goes nuclear?
China
Almost 10 years ago, Congress complained about Beijing illicitly diverting US Westinghouse nuclear power technology to upgrade Chinese nuclear submarines. Recently, the Pentagon has warned that China is likely using plutonium and tritium from its civilian fast reactor, spent fuel reprocessing, and heavy water reactor programs to expand its nuclear arsenal. None of China’s civilian nuclear plants are under international nuclear inspections. The United States is about to export four more Westinghouse reactors to China. Should it?
In 2008, the Bush administration suspended US nuclear cooperation with Russia after President Vladimir Putin invaded Georgia. Should Washington do the same with China until it can certify that China can’t divert US nuclear technology to military purposes?
Finally, Cameco, a Canadian firm, which owns 49 percent of Westinghouse, sealed one of the largest uranium contracts in history to a subsidiary of China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). CNNC makes China’s nuclear weapons. Should Washington care?
- Should the United States and its allies continue nuclear business as usual with Beijing?
Reactors in war zones
Both the Biden and Trump administrations have promoted nuclear reactor exports, including to war-torn regions of the Middle East, Eastern Europe, South and East Asia. Neither administration has said anything about the vulnerability of these or existing plants to military assaults.
US nuclear plants sited overseas are not the only plants at risk of such assaults. Last fall, the Pentagon forecast China could have its first nonnuclear intercontinental missile by 2030. China is watching Russia’s missile attacks against Ukraine nuclear plants closely. Should we worry that China might threaten to strike US reactors?
Should the United States test the resilience of new and existing reactors to missile attacks? If so, how? What kinds of hardening might mitigate the risks of missile attacks and radiological releases? Should the International Atomic Energy Agency and-or NATO help? In what ways? Who should pay for the defense of US nuclear plants—the US government or reactor vendors? Should nuclear plants be built in war-prone locations overseas?
The Biden and Trump administrations have either been in odd agreement on these issues or ignored them altogether. Journalists (and other citizens) should spotlight this, flush the candidates out, and hold their next president accountable for their answers.
- What should Washington do to protect nuclear plants from military assaults?