Last week, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States released its final report. Although Congress tasked it to assess the role of space systems in America’s strategic posture, the commission dedicated less than a half-page of its 160-page review to this matter. Of its 20 pages of specific recommendations, the commission made none on space.
This seems odd. As China and Russia build up their nuclear arsenals well beyond what America has deployed, the cost and impracticality of quantitatively countering these threats only grows. The commission report rightly recommends the United States make its strategic nuclear forces less vulnerable to a potential first strike.
But what of the argument that to do this America and its allies must be able to stun or disable its adversaries’ military eyes, ears, voices, and nervous systems both on Earth and in space? Those who argue this maintain that if America commands space, it can be assured of victory in war and, better yet, be able to deter conflicts. Does it follow that if America and its allies lose assured command of space, acquiring more and better nuclear weapons may be for naught?
What does securing command of space demand? What would it enable our military to do? What space capabilities are our key space adversary — China — and our key Asian allies—Japan and South Korea — planning to employ? What will implementing America’s current space strategy entail and cost? What might alternatives to this strategy entail? Which, if any, space capacities and military actions does the Outer Space Treaty (to which Russia, China, the United States, and most states in Asia and Europe are parties) allow or prohibit? Can these limits be enforced? What can space war simulations do to help get the answers?
NPEC commissioned some of the nation’s top military and legal space experts to examine these issues. It then held a series of space simulations to test their answers out. The result, which my staff and I are releasing today, is a 354-page volume, Space: America’s New Strategic Front Line (introduction below). It features insights from space policy experts and practitioners and more than suggests that strategic deterrence will depend on securing space superiority.
Published October 2023
Published by: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Edited by: Henry Sokolski
For a physical Amazon copy of the book click here.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………..3
Space: America’s New Strategic Front Line
Henry Sokolski…………………………………………………………………4
Part I
How Space-Power Theory Affects One’s Deterrence Outlook
Brent Ziarnick…………………………………………………………….9
Should Achieving Space Superiority be America’s Immediate Military Objective?
Peter Hays………………………………………………………………..56
Bluewater and Brownwater Space Strategies and Their Budgetary Profiles
Peter Garretson………………………………………………………….89
Part II
China Space Ambitions: Drivers, Goals, and Capacities
Namrata Goswami……………………………………………………113
Japan and South Korea: Two Important Partners for the United States for Space Security in East Asia
Sam Wilson…………………………………………………………….159
Part III
A Synergistic Approach: Diplomatic and Unilateral Measures to Counter Chinese Anti-Satellite Spacecraft, Lasers, and Jammers
Brian Chow and Brandon Kelley……………………………….176
The Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Consequences of Nuclear Explosion in Space
Gregory Jones…………………………………………………………253
Current Space Law: How Much Protection Might It Provide?
Laura Montgomery…………………………………………………..271
Part IV
China Waging War in Space: An After-Action…………301
Pyongyang Goes Nuclear in Space: An After-Action Report……………………………………………………………………316
Commercial Satellite Use Catalyzes Nuclear-Armed States to Combat: A Wargame After-Action Report……………………………..332
About the Authors……………………………………………………….354
Space: America’s New Strategic Front Line
Henry Sokolski
America is steadily recognizing that space is a critical front line for strategic deterrence. The Pentagon has made space a new warfighting domain, created a U.S. Space Force, reestablished a U.S. Space Command, and supported allied efforts to create similar military space institutions. The question now is what such organizations should do.
One popular idea is that the United States and its space-faring partners should proliferate thousands of dual-use and dedicated military low-Earth orbit satellites that would be difficult for China or Russia to knockout. To reduce these constellations’ cost and speed their development, the Pentagon would ask private space companies to assume much of this work. These satellite constellations would look down to earthly commercial and military operations. To help assure their continued operation in wars, the U.S. government would encourage commercial firms to reconstitute these constellations quickly with cheap, reusable launch systems. These efforts would afford a passive form of defense against anti-satellite attacks and obviate the need for destructive, active space defense systems.
Another view, compatible with this proliferated space architecture, is making space a sanctuary in which the United States and its allies do all they can to prevent it from being “militarized.” Washington, it is argued, should encourage more international agreements with other space-faring nations — including China and Russia — to limit or ban anti-satellite operations; increase notice and data sharing on space launches, satellite locations, and operations; and establish rules regarding accidents and military liability. While attempting to secure such agreements, Washington and its partners should also build resilient satellite constellations that could passively survive possible attacks.
A final view that contrasts with these favors deterring space combat by establishing American military, civil, and commercial space superiority. This entails creating superior space launch capacity to launch payloads in all orbits; enabling satellites to transit to new orbits quickly; and being able to disable, dazzle and, if necessary, destroy hostile spacecraft. This hawkish view is generally paired with an expansive view of space commerce and exploration to assure both increased economic prosperity and to secure military “high” ground in cislunar space and beyond. It also is a view held by those wary of relying on space arms control.
Each of these views has their backers; none is entirely without merit. This prompts a series of questions. What is the optimal mix? Which one should be emphasized more than the other, at what time, and for how long? Which actions called for by each should be privatized and to what extent? Which should receive government support, to what extent, and in what form? Does it make sense to see space as a truly separate military domain like sea, land, and air? Or is it more appropriate to view space as an arena that lends support to warfighters conducting terrestrial combat?
Any effort to focus on the further development of U.S. and allied space capabilities, especially with an eye on deterring wars, must grapple with these issues. This volume is designed to help. It is broken into four sections.
The first focuses on how to think about the different schools of space strategy. Brent Ziarnick of the Air War University gives us an overview of how military thinkers have approached space deterrence and how it relates to combat on Earth. He offers a critique of those that attempt to apply nuclear deterrence theories to space. Peter Hays of George Washington University follows with a review of the most prominent views on deterring space combat. He makes the case for pursuing space superiority. This brings us to Pete Garretson’s work. He details alternative budgets for a brown-water (downward-looking, Earth-servicing) space satellite force and a blue-water (expansive outwardly bound) space force system.
The volume’s next section focuses on the emerging space activities of America’s key Asian allies — South Korea and Japan — and its key adversary — China. Namrata Goswami details just how Beijing is challenging U.S. and allied command of space. Sam Wilson explains Japan’s and South Korea’s space plans.
This brings us to the volume’s third section – a collection of studies briefed to the participants of three NPEC space wargames. The first of these studies is by Brian Chow and Brandon Kelley on emerging non-nuclear anti-satellite warfare threats — rendezvous satellite operations, ground-based lasers, and electronic warfare operations. This chapter details the threats and describes how best to cope with each militarily and diplomatically. The second chapter is by Greg Jones. It details the likely consequences of a nuclear explosion in space. This section’s last study is by Laura Montgomery. It focuses on the ambiguities in the Outer Space Treaty, including the kind of orbiting weapons that are covered and what space weapons are not.
The volume’s final section contains the NPEC space wargame after-action reports. The first is a wargame in which China blockades Taiwan and interferes with Japanese and South Korean satellites in an attempt to keep Japan and South Korea from helping Taiwan. The game ends with China attacking key U.S. military satellites. The second wargame has North Korea exploding a nuclear weapon in low-Earth orbit. One of the goals of this game is to understand the limits of international space law and the security risks of depending too heavily on low-Earth orbit satellite systems. The last wargame has Pakistani terrorists and India using dual-use Chinese and U.S. satellite services to strike military ground targets. This, in turn, catalyzes the United States and China to engage in space combat.
All of these games were designed to help determine if a “space Lusitania” is possible — a conflict in which the use of dual-use space services by lesser states could catalyze into a strategic conflict between major powers. Each validated that such escalation indeed was possible. This, in turn, suggests that space is, in fact, a separate military domain — a military theater, like those on Earth in which combat can escalate to total war. It also suggests that space is becoming a front line both of strategic combat and deterrence.
To read the full volume, click here.