This Saturday, Steve Witkoff, Trump’s envoy to the Middle East, will meet with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi to flesh out the details of a nuclear deal. As I explain in the attached National Interest op-ed, “Will an Iran Deal Make Nuclear Proliferation Great Again?,” they will have to focus on two questions. First, what kind of agreement—if any—might prevent Iran from getting a bomb? Second, how can an agreement be reached on Iran enriching uranium—an activity that can bring a state to the brink of bomb-making—without encouraging other states to demand similar treatment?
It appears as though Mr. Witkoff and Foreign Minister Aragchi will attempt to square the difference between having Iran dismantle its entire nuclear and missile program, and incrementally returning to the nuclear deal President Obama struck in 2015. As I note, the concern with this approach is the precedent it will likely set for other nations the United States wants to conduct civil nuclear cooperation with, starting with Saudi Arabia.
Whether or not a deal is finally struck with Iran, uranium enrichment—a nuclear process that brings states to the brink of nuclear bomb-making—will increasingly be seen as a right every nation should exercise. Unfortunately, both our intelligence agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency have had bad luck detecting military diversions from nuclear fuel-making: by the time a diversion is detected, there’s a real chance it’s too late to prevent bombs from being made.
All this raises much larger questions that our policy makers should ponder. Among them: Do we need to clarify what nuclear activities and materials are distant enough from bomb-making to keep safe, and which are too close to bomb-making to be anything but dangerous? Can we deter Iran and others from getting the bomb by threatening to sanction them in advance with our allies now? Or is that no longer possible? Are we willing to go to war or would this be a mistake? Finally, do we still believe we can share dangerous nuclear technology as we have for peaceful purposes without spreading the bomb?
The short answer to the last question should be obvious. Curious to get your take.
You can read the full article here.
April 24, 2025
Author: Henry Sokolski
Will an Iran Deal Make Nuclear Proliferation Great Again?
This Saturday, Steve Witkoff, Trump’s envoy to the Middle East, will meet Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Aragchi, to flesh out the details of a nuclear deal. They will have to focus on two questions. First, what kind of agreement, if any, might prevent Iran from getting a bomb. Second, how can an agreement be reached on Iran enriching uranium — an activity that can bring a state to the brink of bomb making — without encouraging other states to demand similar treatment?
Four weeks ago, we had an answer. The U.S. National Security Advisor, Mike Waltz, and Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, backed the “Libya option” – make Iran dismantle its nuclear plants, the missiles to deliver them, and turn off their hostile proxy activities.
Then, with the support of Vice President J.D. Vance, Witkoff floated a scaled-back negotiating position—narrowing the administration’s goals to 1) keeping Iranian enrichment capped at 3.67 percent and 2) verifying that Iran was not diverting uranium to make nuclear weapons.
This position lasted less than 24 hours. After a White House meeting that Trump chaired, Witkoff reversed course and adopted Waltz’s position, announcing, “Iran must stop and eliminate its nuclear enrichment and weaponization program.”
This pleased Iran hawks, who believed Witkoff’s earlier scaled-back position simply mimicked the “disastrous” 2015 Obama deal. That understanding “mistakenly” presumed Iran could enrich uranium without making bombs if these activities were monitored.
Now these hawks are worried. Will Witkoff yet reverse course again, compromise, and allow such a deal? There is cause for concern on three fronts.
First, you have to be a diplomat or a politician to believe timely detection or warning of an Iranian military diversion is possible if Iran hijacks its uranium enrichment plants to make bombs. By the time U.S. intelligence or international nuclear monitors could confirm Iran had done this, it would be too late to intervene to keep Iran from producing its first nuclear weapon.
Second, trying to detect and prevent weaponization is difficult at best. The International Atomic Energy Agency has struggled with this. Historically, our intelligence agencies have had checkered history.
This is unlikely to change: the last few steps necessary to fashion nuclear weapons material into workable bombs – can be conducted in small, remote facilities that are extremely difficult to detect. This painful reality dogged Biden’s attempt to revive Obama’s original nuclear deal: as Iran got closer to getting a bomb, the odds of it sprinting to the finish line only increased.
Finally, there’s the precedent of allowing Iranian uranium enrichment would set. If Trump allows Iran to continue to enrich, other nations that Washington wants to share nuclear technology with – the U.A.E., Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, Poland, South Korea, and especially Saudi Arabia – would demand similar treatment.
The Saudi case is of immediate concern. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (MBS) has repeatedly warned that if he thinks Iran is getting a bomb, Riyadh will get one too. That’s why he is demanding that Washington help him enrich uranium on Saudi soil as part of any nuclear cooperative agreement Washington might strike.
This puts us in a pickle. If team Trump fails to get Iran to dismantle its enrichment plants (which is almost certain) but allows MBS to do so, the latter becomes the new normal, supercharging nuclear proliferation globally. On the other hand, if Trump allows Iran to continue to enrich, it is a foregone conclusion Washington must allow MBS to do the same.
All of this raises a number of larger questions. Is it smart for the United States to promote nuclear power in dangerous places – particularly in the gas-and sun-soaked Middle East? After all, we now know that Iran used its “peaceful,” International Atomic Energy Agency-safeguarded Bushehr nuclear power plant as a covert acquisition front to acquire nearly all it needed to make a bomb. Does America want to help other nations in war-torn regions follow this model?
Also, after more than a half-century, shouldn’t we reconsider the international rules as to which nuclear activities and materials are distant enough from bomb making to keep safe and which are too close to bomb making to be anything but dangerous?
What are we prepared to do if Iran gets a bomb? Can we still get our trading partners to join us in threatening serious sanctions against Iran if it reneges on its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty pledge not to get nuclear weapons? Are we willing to risk going to war with Iran if we can’t?
Or should we hope, as we did in the l960s, when President Kennedy feared 20 or so nations might get the bomb, that we can continue to spread dangerous nuclear technologies and materials without spreading the bomb? The answer should be no.