Arresting Nuclear Adventurism: China, Article VI, and the NPT
Edited by Henry Sokolski and Andrea Beck

June 2022
Cover images, from top left clockwise: 1) A screen image from the Chinese Communist Party television network CCTV shows a formation of People’s Liberation Army Dongfeng-41 fourth-generation solid-fueled, road-mobile, intercontinental ballistic missiles parading in Beijing in 2019. (credit: CCTV); 2) The United Nations building at sunset (Credit: Shutterstock/ James Steidl); 3) Greenpeace activists and other NGO’s at Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited's Reprocessing Plant in Rokkasho protesting against the tests and reprocessing of depleted uranium (credit: Greenpeace/ Jeremy Sutton-Hibbert); 4) The building housing the China Experimental Fast Reactor (credit: China National Nuclear Corporation).
Arresting Nuclear Adventurism: China, Article VI, and the NPT

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The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), a 501(c)3 nonprofit organization, is a nonpartisan, educational organization founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues. NPEC educates policymakers, journalists, and university professors about proliferation threats and possible new policies and measures to meet them.

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About NPEC:

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The Diplomatic Simulation of China Violating the NPT was not for attribution. The views contained herein do not necessarily reflect the views of each participant or the official policy of their respective agencies, private sector organizations, or the United States Government.
# Simulation Participants

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Executive Summary:

Given the current crisis in Ukraine, it’s tempting to consider focusing on Chinese compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to be an academic indulgence. Giving into this inclination, however, would be a mistake. As dangerous as Russia currently is, China will be more threatening in the long run. As we are learning with Russia’s violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, enforcing binding understandings is critical lest violators run roughshod over law and good order. This is true with Russia’s behavior in Ukraine. It is no less so with China’s nuclear weapons buildup and its repeated refusal to join in good faith negotiations to limit its nuclear weapons activities, which is required by Article VI of the NPT.

This buildup and refusal clearly flies in the face of China’s legal NPT obligations. The question is what might bring Beijing back into compliance. To get the answers, NPEC held a battery of workshops last fall, followed by a week-long diplomatic simulation. The game participants included U.S., Japanese, and Australian former and current officials and staff as well as outside experts.

The group concluded that Beijing is unlikely to comply willingly with the NPT anytime soon, but that U.S. and international security would still be best served by spotlighting Beijing’s nuclear adventurism and suggesting diplomatic off-ramps to arrest its nuclear buildup.

What this entails can best be summarized by the group’s four key findings:

1. **China’s nuclear weapons buildup and its refusal to negotiate in good faith to limit its nuclear arsenal constitutes a clear NPT compliance concern.** Article VI of the NPT stipulates that each of the parties to the treaty “undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” It has specific, enforceable meaning. China’s unwillingness to join in nuclear arms reduction talks with Russia and the United States until American and Russian arsenals come down to Chinese levels as China more than doubles its own nuclear numbers constitutes a not-so-subtle evasion of Article VI. Beijing’s prevarication is compounded by evidence of China’s nuclear buildup (e.g., the construction of hundreds of new missile silos, Beijing’s crash “civilian” plutonium production efforts to expand its nuclear stockpile, the suspicious activities China is conducting at its nuclear test sites, etc.). China gives token support to gridlocked talks to ban “weapons” in space and discussions on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). It also participates in a dedicated forum that brings together the five nuclear weapon states of the UN Security Council. It supports disarmament resolutions at the UN and professes a no first use policy. None of this, however, releases China from its Article VI requirement to negotiate in good faith with the United States and other NPT
nuclear weapons states to limit nuclear arms. At best, referring to these forums and proposals constitutes diplomatic smoke designed to deflect requests China join in specific negotiations to reduce nuclear numbers. Given bureaucratic conservatism within the U.S. Department of State, finding China in clear, legal violation of Article VI is unlikely. Finding that its nuclear behavior raises NPT compliance concerns, however, is bureaucratically feasible.

2. **Pressuring Beijing to uphold its NPT obligations may afford strategic benefits to Washington and its allies, but these are unlikely to be realized unless the United States and other NPT nuclear weapons states back effective nuclear restraints.** None of the game's participants believed pressuring China to enter in earnest nuclear talks would be easy. Yet, all believed taking China to task regarding its Article VI obligations could help increase the diplomatic costs of China expanding its nuclear arsenal, maintain the integrity of the NPT, and strengthen U.S.-allied ties and U.S. relations with nonaligned states. None of this is likely to obtain, however, if Washington and its nuclear-armed allies are seen to be trying to gain greater nuclear superiority over China and have no serious nuclear limitation proposals to offer. In this case, nonaligned states would continue to attack the United States, the UK, and France at the United Nations and in other multilateral disarmament forums (e.g., in Geneva, New York, and Vienna). If, on the other hand, Washington and its nuclear armed allies promoted new, effective nuclear controls (limits that might be made contingent on China or Russia also agreeing to comply in some fashion), the group thought many states, including nonaligned nations, would likely support efforts to get China to reciprocate and uphold its Article VI obligations. All of these observations are salient to what America and like-minded states might say at this August's NPT Review Conference; the annual sessions of the UN First Committee; the sessions of the Conference on Disarmament; and at the meetings of the IAEA Board of Governors this September and November.

3. **A successful NPT campaign regarding China’s noncompliance, would require Washington to shed normal modes of operation.** At a minimum, Washington would have to share much more sensitive intelligence on Chinese nuclear activities than it has with allies as well as nonaligned nations. It would have to declassify much of this information to convince the world that China’s nuclear buildup is both real and threatening. Beyond that, Washington would need to promote talk on nuclear limits to uphold its Article VI obligations. Ideally, this would entail proposing nuclear control positions with other nuclear armed states — e.g., by restricting plutonium production for any purpose, establishing nuclear hotlines, clarifying the terms of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (perhaps at a P-5 meeting), adopting new nuclear transparency measures (including more reporting to the UN, the IAEA, and IAEA safeguarding of Chinese and nuclear states’ most militarily useful “civilian” nuclear
facilities), freezing or reducing strategic nuclear weapon numbers, etc. Care would have
to be taken, however, not to rush to get to yes embracing positions — e.g., jettisoning
missile defenses or of America’s extended nuclear deterrence policies — that might fray
Washington’s ties with its closest allies. Securing the active support of our allies and
that of non-nuclear weapon states (e.g., members of the Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Initiative or NPDI, the Stockholm Initiative, etc.), would be critical to any
effective Article VI China compliance campaign. Washington also would have to take
an even more active role than it currently does in international nuclear control forums in
Geneva (at the Conference on Disarmament), Vienna (at the International Atomic
Energy Agency), and New York (at the UN First Committee, UN Disarmament
Committee, and the NPT Preparatory Committee and Review Conferences).

4. Military leverage will be important to move China on Article VI, but, in the short
and long-term, the highest military leverage may not be nuclear. Trying to leverage
China’s strategic nuclear buildup by keeping up or getting further ahead quantitatively on a nuclear-warhead-for-nuclear-warhead or nuclear-missile-for-nuclear-
missile basis will hardly play to America’s advantage. For the next decade or more, China will be able to produce new nuclear warheads and missile delivery systems much
more cheaply and quickly than the United States. Rather than enter into a quantitative
nuclear arms race with China, the United States should make it more difficult for China
to target America’s nuclear weapons. This should be done by making U.S. nuclear
systems more difficult to locate, disable, and destroy. There are several ways to do this.
The U.S. can make its ballistic missile submarines stealthier and its land-based missiles
mobile. Virtually proliferating the number of possible air-based nuclear delivery
systems by basing a few nuclear weapons on platforms that are numerous and making
U.S. command, communications, control, and surveillance systems far more secure and
survivable would also help. Ultimately, it is unclear how important nuclear weapons
will be to providing strategic deterrence as more discriminate ways of disabling
countries are developed in the coming decades (e.g., with high-precision, long-range
unmanned conventional strike systems; cyber warfare and crypto technologies;
unmanned surface and underwater naval warfare and sensors systems; resilient space-
based military systems etc.). Conversely, America and like-minded nations will hardly
be able to isolate China regarding Beijing’s nuclear buildup, if the United States, which
currently has more nuclear weapons than China, chooses to acquire even more.

Wargame Format and Scenario:

The simulation was played in three moves: (1) a mock U.S. interagency meeting, (2) a mock
Pacific summit of U.S. allies, and (3) a hot wash to discuss findings and develop strategy
recommendations. Move one began in 2022 and participants engaged in a mock U.S. interagency meeting to develop a range of U.S. diplomatic, international, and allied coordinated actions for meaningful nuclear arms control negotiations with China. The purpose of these negotiations was to spotlight China’s nuclear expansion and encourage China to adopt forms of nuclear restraint.

Move two simulated a Pacific summit hosted by the United States with Japan and Australia to stress test the U.S. strategy with key U.S. allies. Participants debated the merits of America’s case to take action regarding China’s compliance with the NPT and what international forums to share concerns about China’s nuclear activities. They also identified useful pressure points that could move the PRC to negotiate and what intelligence Washington needed to share with whom.

In move three, the group discussed the simulation and its key findings.

**Move One – United States Interagency Principals Meeting**

In move one, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence briefed principals at the interagency meeting on the latest U.S. intelligence regarding China’s nuclear activities (see appendix for full U.S. intelligence briefing). China had refused to participate in U.S.–Russian nuclear talks, citing its refusal to engage until Russia and the U.S. come down to its level.

The United States had also received intelligence of suspected Chinese reprocessing of power reactor fuel and use of civil reactors to produce tritium. This reprocessing was in violation of China’s peaceful end use agreements with the United States and possibly others, and in possible violation of the PRC’s 1997 IAEA voluntary reporting understanding.

After Washington’s fourth request that China join talks underway with Russia to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race,” China rejected the invitation and was suspected of short cycling and reprocessing spent fuel from its civilian power reactors including the U.S. AP 1000 reactors and Westinghouse-designed Chinese design variants. Several Senators raised concerns that China may have violated its promise not to reprocess U.S.-origin spent fuel without prior U.S. consent as well as previous concerns about nuclear testing. Washington also had evidence that China was continuing to assist Saudi Arabia in production of yellow cake.

U.S. intelligence had difficulty verifying Chinese reprocessing of power reactor fuel. However, multiple intelligence sources noted reprocessing activity and the movement of a significant number of tritium containers from a variety of power reactor sites to one of China’s tritium
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extraction plants. Washington also identified an increase in activity at China’s Lop Nur nuclear weapons test site. China blocked data from its international monitoring stations.

PLA commentators discussed the need to expand their nuclear arsenal. Meanwhile, PLA commentators also stated the need to field roughly 2,500 nuclear weapons to deter the United States. At the NPT Review Conference, Japan, which had not yet begun operation of its own reprocessing plant at Rokkasho, objected to China’s suspect nuclear activities as being in violation of Article VI of the treaty. In response, the Chinese complained about Japan's planned operation of reprocessing and enrichment facilities at Rokkasho and its connivance in the Quad, AUKUS, and U.S.-Japan nuclear-related activities.

Given this background, principals met at a U.S. interagency meeting to develop a strategy for a possible Pacific summit. The group questioned what type of intelligence, in what volume should be shared with whom regarding the Chinese nuclear buildup. It agreed that the United States would need to share as much intelligence as possible, even though it risked leaking to the Russians.

The Secretary of Energy suggested that Washington ask the IAEA to inspect the most troubling facilities to verify the intelligence. The Vice President said that if the United States could show that China was diverting material from its civil nuclear sector to its military sector, our allies would follow our lead. The National Intelligence Officer for WMD said that this activity would be apparent upon inspection and convincing. Should China refuse IAEA inspections, that would indicate Beijing had something to hide and also help Washington build a broader coalition.

When questioned whether the United States would be in danger of a successful first strike by China, the Secretary of Defense assured the group that Washington would retain a survivable second strike. However, East Asian allies would be deeply concerned about the United States’ ability to maintain nuclear security assurances. This would be greatly troubling to the Japanese and South Koreans, who might decide to pursue their own nuclear program.

The National Security Advisor questioned how practical it was to find China in violation of the NPT. The Secretary of State suggested a softer approach: Rather than try to prove China was in violation of the NPT — a hard sell — find Beijing’s behavior to raise NPT compliance concerns. This softer sell would help consolidate general support to pressure China to restrain its nuclear activities and politically penalize them for not doing so.

The most effective case against the Chinese entailed getting non-traditional U.S. partners to speak up. These would include the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Group of Latin American and Caribbean countries (GRULAC), the Africa Group, state parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
A strong statement from NATO and non-traditional U.S. allies might even pressure Beijing to come to the negotiating table.

The Secretary of Energy warned pointing the finger at China could backfire. China could turn the tables on the United States, claiming Washington, not China is in violation of Article VI due to U.S. behavior and numbers of warheads. However, other principals pushed back, stating the United States’ position is far more defensible than that of China. Washington has been acting in good faith to meet its NPT obligations by reducing its arsenal and engaging the Russians in arms negotiations. While there is nothing new in accusing the United States of violating Article VI, evidence of a massive Chinese build-up and Beijing’s refusal to come to the table for talks are quite recent developments that are more destabilizing.

The group agreed that future Nuclear Posture Review and the National Defense Strategy-related presentations should clarify how the United States interprets Article VI, explain how the United States has upheld its obligations to the treaty, and spell out what other nations need to do. Presenting this positive narrative at forums, such as the UN First Committee, would serve as a contrast to China’s nuclear misbehavior. Whenever appropriate, Washington should call for resolutions reaffirming each nation’s obligation to negotiate in good faith under Article VI.

The discussion then turned to asking for action at the UN or IAEA. If Washington had enough credible evidence of China diverting civil nuclear materials to weapons production, it could approach the IAEA director general and ask that he request inspections of suspected Chinese facilities. If China pushed back, that would be telling. The Director of National Intelligence agreed, but suggested it would be better for a U.S. ally to approach the IAEA, so not to appear that the United States was exerting undue influence over the IAEA.

The National Intelligence Officer for Weapons of Mass Destruction suggested that U.S. allies could act as well: Japan could agree to hold off opening the Rokkasho reprocessing plant, South Korea could delay start up reprocessing, and India might make an equivalent offer.

The conversation then shifted to how the U.S. Congress might legislate to exert pressure on China. The Vice President reminded the group of bipartisan legislation introduced by Senators Rubio and Markey in 2016 calling for a provision in the U.S. law that stated, “it is the sense of Congress, that the United States should encourage countries in East Asia to forego the commencement of new spent fuel reprocessing activities as part of a mutual effort to prevent the increased or expanded stockpiling of separated plutonium in the region.” The National Intelligence Officer for WMD suggested that Congress could require the president to certify that China was in compliance with the NPT as a stipulation for continuing some action China might want the U.S. to take or to continue taking.
The group decided to call a Pacific Summit with Australia and Japan that would promote the following three ideas:

1. There should be two intelligence briefings. One would share our most sensitive information with the Five Eyes and our closest allies. Another would be less detailed for presentation to key nonaligned states.

2. Give the IAEA director general the first brief and ask him to request an inspection of key civil Chinese nuclear facilities.

3. Explore with Australia and Japan the practicality of pausing advanced reactor and key fuel cycle activities.

Separately, the group decided to encourage Congress to:

1. Build on the Rubio Markey 2016 legislation to produce a resolution calling on nations around the Pacific Rim to pause commercial deployment of fast reactors and spent fuel recycling.

2. Pass legislation requiring the President to certify that China is in compliance with the NPT as a condition for continued trade in certain sectors.

The Pacific Summit

The Director of National Intelligence shared the details of the U.S. intelligence briefing. In specific, the U.S. sought to 1) reaffirm the significance of the NPT and make noncompliance with the treaty a public issue; 2) ask the IAEA to inspect the Chinese facilities under question; and 3) ask Japan not to open its Rokkasho facility. The United States asked the allies for their opinions on the degree to which these actions would succeed in changing China’s nuclear trajectory and what other actions could be taken.

The U.S. National Security Advisor underscored the need to call China out on its noncompliance with Article VI of the NPT, stating that if Beijing’s intentions were good, then emphasizing Article VI would allow China to demonstrate its good faith. However, if the PRC’s intentions were more sinister, Article VI could serve as rallying cry to encourage other nations to join the U.S. and allies in addressing the Chinese nuclear threat.

Both the Japanese and Australian delegations agreed that focusing on Article VI would strengthen support for the treaty. They also recommended pressing China to open its civil facilities to inspections, thereby broadening the remit of Article IV. Finally, they suggested
taking China to task for proliferating nuclear weapons-related technology to North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.

Regarding America’s vulnerability to counter charges of being in violation of Article VI, the Japanese Foreign Minister suggested Washington take a number of arms control initiatives. Among the ideas considered was clarifying the terms of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (what is a nuclear test). This could pressure China to formalize its moratorium on nuclear testing. The United States should renew negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, asking China to support the spirit of the treaty by suspending production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Japan’s Defense Minister suggested that the United States, Russia and China enter into a regional INF treaty with Japan and the Far East. The Australian government might enforce its bilateral agreement on the supply of uranium to China, insisting on the end-use assurance that uranium provided by Australia be used only for civilian purposes. To counter potential Chinese claims that the United States allowed India to use American uranium for military purposes, Washington could ask India to restrict its uranium to civil purposes as well.

The Japanese Foreign Minister noted that suspending work on Japan’s planned reprocessing plant at Rokkasho would be difficult. Only if China and South Korea were asked not to operate their commercial reprocessing plants, might Japan freeze operations at Rokkasho.

The Summit then turned to the question of what Washington and its allies should be prepared to do if China came to the negotiating table. China would likely ask the United States to reduce its nuclear arsenal, which would require the Russians to do likewise. Beijing would also want the United States to limit its missile defenses.

Australian officials said the time was not right, geopolitically, to begin the denuclearization process and urged Washington not to step back from its nuclear commitments to its allies in the Pacific by reducing its nuclear arsenal. Should the United States fail to constrain China and accept mutual vulnerability or parity with China publicly, it would undermine U.S.-allied relations.

Participants considered, ultimately, what would happen in the region if the United States failed to maintain its relative nuclear superiority vis-a-vis China. In this case, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan might get nuclear weapons of their own. Strong anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan and public support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons would likely make it the last country in the region to acquire weapons.

South Korea, though, is another matter. Conservatives in South Korea have already discussed obtaining weapons or seeking American help to re-introduce U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in
the country, and the South Korean public does not have the same apprehensions against nuclear weapons as the Japanese.

TPNW issue and suggested that the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) – grouping of 12 cross regional countries, focused on pushing consensus outcomes at NPT (Japan and Australia started in 2010, Germany Netherlands, Nigeria, UAE, Mexico, Chile, Philippines, UAE, Turkey) – should make efforts to be more visible at the NPT conference. The Australian Foreign Minister agreed, stating that the NPDI is already making progress in this area. Success depends on how the Article 6 issue is raised. Australia has come close to making this point publicly already, and its Ambassador to China said publicly at a conference in China that “it will be important for other nuclear weapon states, including China, to embrace these developments and – consistent with their obligations under Article VI of the NPT – commit to taking similar steps towards achieving meaningful disarmament. We encourage China to engage in Strategic Stability talks with the United States.” The Australian

The Summit concluded with agreement to pursue the following action plan, which was subsequently confirmed in the game’s concluding hot wash session:

International Initiatives

The U.S., its allies, and supporters should spotlight China’s noncompliance with Article VI of the NPT. While China might not immediately change its nuclear course, spotlighting its conduct would start a useful discussion. It would garner more support internationally to have Japan and Australia take the lead rather than Washington.

Encourage the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI consisting of Australia, Japan, Germany, Netherlands, Nigeria, UAE, Mexico, Chile, Philippines, UAE, Mexico, and Turkey) to raise noncompliance concerns about China and Article VI. They might build on the request Australia’s ambassador to China recently made of Beijing to embrace the world’s desire to reduce nuclear weapons “and – consistent with their obligations under Article VI of the NPT – commit to taking similar steps towards achieving meaningful disarmament.”

Propose that all weapons states under the NPT open their civil nuclear facilities to IAEA inspectors. This proposal should be introduced by non-nuclear weapons states, such as Japan, Australia, Ireland, the UAE, Mexico or Canada. The United States should announce that it will allow its civil enrichment and any fast reactor related activities to be safeguarded by the IAEA. The United States should implore China to do the same.
Ask Australia to follow in the footsteps of Taiwan and the UAE to announce a timeout on any plans to enrich or reprocess.

U.S. China Initiatives

The United States should offer to consider agreements that would cap all NPT weapons states’ nuclear arsenals at agreed levels.

The United States should propose that China engage in stability talks (regarding such ideas as hotlines), not only with Washington but with its key neighbors.

Allied Initiatives

The United States and Japan should consider attending the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons conferences as an observer.

The P-5 should issue a joint statement reaffirming their continued adherence to a nuclear weapons test moratorium, which could politically bind China, and agree to further clarify what a nuclear test is.

Propose that all nations on the Pacific Rim including Australia, China, North and South Korea, Japan, and the United States take a timeout from civil recycling of plutonium.
Appendix I - U.S. Intelligence Briefing

The U.S. Intelligence briefing was reported by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), who noted that Washington had released its annual “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” in November 2021. In a sharp change from previous years, the U.S. confirmed China’s accelerated nuclear expansion and its intention to have at least 1,000 warheads by 2030. The United States held a side event at the January 2022 NPT Review Conference in which it reiterated its public findings and underscored its concerns over Chinese activity. Washington also confirmed that China had rebuffed multiple attempts by the U.S. to engage on strategic stability talks.

China pushed back on these assertions. However, U.S. Pacific allies reached out privately to the United States to indicate they shared U.S. concerns and would be more outspoken on the issue if Washington shared reliable, persuasive intelligence with its allies. Not only did the U.S. Pacific allies need to be persuaded themselves, but the allies needed to make the case to the public. While the United States had previously publicly reported China’s goal of attaining 1,000 warheads by 2030, the DNI’s report confirmed that China’s actual goal is to reach 1,500 warheads by 2030 and 2,500 warheads by 2035. This was believed to be a reliable and achievable number.

The DNI confirmed rumors that a highest-level PRC counterintelligence official defected late last year and provided Washington with valuable, accurate intelligence and connected the U.S. intelligence community to other high-ranking individuals in the CCP and PLA. Through these contacts, the intelligence community established that Xi approved an accelerated plan to achieve the PRC goal of reaching 2,500 warheads by 2035. This plan accelerated the timeline to operationalize the FAST Reactor that was initially scheduled to come online by the end of 2023 to the beginning of 2023; the FAST Reactor set to come online in 2025 would now come online at the end of 2023; and accelerated the CAP1400 plan by 18 months.

Xi also focused on the civil sector, specifically civil-military fusion, by exploiting the CAP programs for plutonium and tritium production and militarizing the Canadian-designed heavy water reactors. Using human intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, and other collections methods, the U.S. intelligence community confirmed China had been short-cycling at least ten of its thermal reactors – cycling the reactors every nine months instead of the typical 18-month cycle. This activity was consistent with an effort to harvest weapons grade plutonium. In addition, increased activity was noticed at PRC heavy water reactor plants, tritium containers were observed traveling at higher-than-normal frequency between thermal
plants and tritium extraction plants, and there was an even greater increase of activity at China’s Lop Nur nuclear weapons test site than the U.S. State Department first reported in its 2020 Compliance Report. These PRC activities were coupled with a complete shutdown of data flowing from China’s International Monitoring System stations to the International Data operated by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The intelligence community also verified that China was willing to use more uranium in its designs. Consequently, the CIA concluded, with concurrence from other members of the U.S. intelligence community, that the United States cannot preclude China using their own indigenous designs, the CAP1400, and even existing French, Russian, and American light water reactors to achieve its goals on Xi’s stated timeline. The DNI noted that this was assessed with high confidence.