Dr. Scott Kemp of MIT discusses the various pathways Iran has to divert nuclear materials for bomb making, from dedicated uranium enrichment to plutonium separation. He identifies the possibility of Iran using reactor-grade plutonium from its civilian power program as a key safeguards vulnerability that has largely gone unaddressed.
Read more on Iran’s spent fuel plutonium option in Dr. Kemp’s, “Iran’s other nuclear weapons option — plutonium bombs” and NPEC Executive Director Henry Sokolski’s, “Missing from US-Iran talks: plutonium for more than 200 nuclear bombs.”
Watch below:
Part 1: Introduction and Why We Worry About Uranium Enrichment
Part 2: Dedicated Plutonium Production, Previously Attempted
Part 3: Separated Plutonium, Unlikely To Be An Issue
Part 4: Plutonium from Spent Fuel, A Big Concern That Has Been Left Unaddressed
Part 5: Covert Plutonium Extraction and Regime Stability
