When the Senate returns after its Thanksgiving recess, it will vote on a resolution of disapproval of the U.S.-Saudi civilian nuclear cooperative agreement President Trump signed this summer. The House is unlikely to vote on the deal this Congress. Next year, however, is another matter.
As Sharon Squassoni and I point out in the attached piece, “Why the New Congress Should Condition the U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Deal,” that The National Interest just posted, there likely will be enough votes in the new Congress to condition the agreement. Congress did this with the U.S.-China nuclear cooperative agreement in 1982. We argue that Congress can and should do so with the Saudi nuclear deal.
First, Congress should evaluate how resilient Saudi governance is. Mohammed Bin Salman was at the height of his power when the agreement was negotiated. Now, the crown prince and his Kingdom are literally embattled from Iranian and Houthi attacks. Washington began civilian nuclear cooperation with Iran in 1959. Congress didn’t bother to hold any hearings. The Shah fled Iran in 1979, the program continued, and the United States and Israel bombed Iran’s nuclear program for fear it might produce a nuclear arsenal. This Congress refused to hold any hearings on the Saudi nuclear deal or the solidity of the Saudi regime. The next Congress should.
Beyond this concern, Congress should require the Administration to clarify how the Saudis should operate American nuclear plants in a war zone. The war with Iran and the Houthis could easily linger for some time. Yet, Washington and Riyadh lack any clear safety plan for wartime operations of the American nuclear plants they hope to build. Congress should demand that the U.S. Energy and Defense Departments analyze what military threats a Saudi nuclear program might face and produce a plan to prevent or mitigate them.
Finally, given MBS’s announced intent to get his own bomb if he believes Iran will and MBS’s refusal to allow inspections of anything but select, declared Saudi nuclear sites, Congress must demand compliance with the U.S. Atomic Energy Act requirement that any cooperative agreement afford timely warning of possible military nuclear diversions. For Saudi Arabia and nuclear fuel making, this would entail nearly a year or more of warning. How is this possible? Congress should demand a convincing explanation.
Hearings next year would help.
As always, I’m curious to get your take.
As Ever,
Henry S.
November 18, 2026
By: Henry Sokolski and Sharon Squassoni
Why the New Congress Should Condition the U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Deal
Before Congress adjourns this year, it will consider whether to approve or disapprove President Donald Trump’s U.S.-Saudi civilian nuclear deal.
A resolution of disapproval, already introduced, may fail in the Senate or be vetoed by the president. Or, the president might stall implementation of the agreement until the Saudis meet his demands for normalization with Israel. Whatever happens, Congress needs to condition the implementation of this deal so that Saudi Arabia does not become the next Iran.
The administration knows that the deal contains a pathway for Saudi Arabia to make nuclear fuel—the very nuclear activity the United States and Israel have repeatedly bombed in Iran for fear that Tehran would use it to make a nuclear bomb. Congress needs to block that pathway.
One reason why is Saudi governance. The Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) has concentrated power in his own hands, yet he now lives in fear of Houthi missile strikes, abetted by Iran. Meanwhile, the Houthis complain that the Saudi royals are unworthy guardians of the holy sites of Medina and Mecca. With approximately 43 million Yemeni people and 19 million Saudi nationals, it is reasonable to ask who might be in control of Saudi Arabia in five, 10, or 15 years from now.Washington failed to ask this question in the 1970s when it backed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and his nuclear program, a program that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) inherited. For the last two years, Israel and the United States have been bombing that program. Do we wish to repeat this history? At a minimum, Congress should demand an assessment of the resilience of the Saudi regime. The last thing Washington should do is to build a bomb starter kit in Saudi Arabia, only for the Yemenis—or some other hostile group—to take it over.
Yet another consideration is the safety and security of nuclear facilities in a war zone. The United States and Saudi Arabia lack any safety plan for wartime reactor operations, let alone for fuel-making facilities. Congress should demand that the US Energy and Defense Departments analyze what military threats a Saudi nuclear program might face and produce a plan to prevent or mitigate them.
Then there is a danger the deal will catalyze nuclear weapons proliferation: Saying yes to nuclear fuel-making for Saudi Arabia will encourage the UAE, Turkey, and Egypt to ask for similar treatment. Is Congress prepared to revisit those agreements to spread bomb-making capabilities across the Middle East?
The United States largely assumes it can detect illicit activities in countries like Saudi Arabia, with the help of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Whether missiles or nuclear-related activities, the US record of timely detection is mixed. Moreover, getting the IAEA into facilities quickly for inspections is tricky (especially without the Additional Protocol for the verification of nuclear safeguards that Saudi Arabia refuses to sign).
In light of MBS’ public declaration that Saudi Arabia would develop nuclear weapons if Iran attains some, the burden of proof is on the Trump administration to show exactly why and how it and the IAEA are going to perform much better to deter, detect, and counter nuclear weapons proliferation than they have in the past.
Finally, Congress should insist that the administration prove it can meet Atomic Energy Act requirements for timely warning in case it detects any military diversions from nuclear fuel-making plants it might build in Saudi Arabia. In this case, the administration would need to demonstrate it would have a year or more of warning. Congress must demand clear explanations from the administration about how it will achieve such warning.
Normally, Congress would get answers to these questions in hearings, which this Congress has refused to hold. The next Congress should demand such hearings. More importantly, Congress must condition how any nuclear cooperation goes forward. There are many levers it can pull, including withholding funding or export licensing authority until it receives the information and assurances it needs.
In the early 1980s, Congress did this for nuclear cooperation with China, delaying implementation for 13 years until China adhered to our nonproliferation standards. This time, Congress may need only to condition the agreement until 2028, when a new occupant is in the White House, and there is greater clarity about the stability of the House of Saud.
To read the article in The National Interest, click here.

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