Military Vulnerabilities of Electrical Supply Systems: Lessons from Ukraine 

Military Vulnerabilities of Electrical Supply Systems: Lessons from Ukraine 

As the Trump administration works to stop the war in Ukraine, Russia’s assaults against Ukraine’s civilian electrical supply system are increasing. Just last Saturday, Russia fired 123 drones and 40 missiles, which forced the shutdown of Ukraine’s electrical supply system. This was the second time Russian attacks forced Ukraine to shutdown its grid.

Such attacks are likely the future face of warfare, not just in Europe, but the Far and Middle East,  and, yes, the United States. Are we prepared? What can and should be done to prevent damage to critical civilian electrical supply systems? 

To find out, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center teamed up with Harvard’s Belfer Center and held a workshop to secure the insights of Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, the former CEO and Chairman of the Management Board of the Ukrainian Transmission System Operator, Ukrenergo. Mr. Kudrytskyi served in this position from February 2020 until September 2024 — throughout most of Russia’s attacks against Ukraine’s electrical system. 

Mr. Kudrytskyi’s talk identified specific, practical steps states should take now to mitigate and counter the kinds of military damages Ukraine’s grid has suffered. His bottom line: Ukraine was not properly prepared for Russia’s attacks against Ukraine’s electrical supply system; other states are still not prepared today; they need to be. Besides developing effective civil defenses, governments must explain what threats their public may face and what countering these threats will require.

If the United States and its allies are serious about their defense, Mr. Kudrytskyi’s presentation is essential listening. NPEC has broken his talk into digestible clips below.

As always, I’m curious to get your take. 

Military Vulnerabilities of Electrical Supply Systems: Lessons from Ukraine

Volodymyr Kudrytskyi

January 30, 2025

Part I: Introducing Volodymyr Kudrytskyi: Military Vulnerabilities of Ukraine’s Electrical Supply System — An Overview 

Part II: How did Russia try to disrupt Ukraine’s electrical grid?

Part III: How did Russia try to disrupt Ukraine’s nuclear power plants? What did Ukraine learn?

Part IV: What preparedness measures would have helped Ukraine’s electrical supply system in 2022?

Part V: What dependencies within the electric sector could have been fixed before the bombs started?

Part VI: What is the ideal generation mix for electrical grid resilience?

Part VII: What might drive other countries to improve the resiliency of their own electrical supply systems?

Part VIII: How do you see the role of the distribution system in the future?

Part IX: How the IAEA’s failure to punish Russia is setting a bad international example

Part X: How can vulnerabilities be mitigated in the new distribution system suggested?

Part XI: What have you learned about communicating with the public?

Part XII: What was the cyber damage to Ukrainian infrastructure?

Part XIII: Ukraine wasn’t fully prepared. Everyone else isn’t prepared yet either. They need to be.